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PITFALLS IN DEVELOPING LANDS BURDENED BY 
NON-PARTICIPATING ROYALTY: CALCULATING 
THE ROYALTY SHARE AND COEXISTING WITH 
THE DUTY OWED TO THE NON-PARTICIPATING 
ROYALTY OWNER BY THE EXECUTIVE INTEREST∗ 
[reprint, first published 1995] 
PHILLIP E. NORVELL** 
I. Introduction 
Non-participating royalty may be severed1 from the mineral estate,2 and 
when severed, only entitles the owner to its prescribed share of production, 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ This article was originally published in the Arkansas Law Review. See Phillip E. 
Norvell, Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty: Calculating 
the Royalty Share and Coexisting with the Duty Owed to the Non-Participating Royalty 
Owner by the Executive Interest, 48 ARK. L. REV. 933 (1995). The Journal would like to 
thank Professor Norvell and the editorial staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their 
permission to republish the article. For more information about the Arkansas Law Review, 
visit http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawreview/. 
 ** Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
 1. A non-participating royalty interest may be created by grant or by reservation. To 
facilitate this discussion, the terms will be used interchangeably. 
 2. A non-participating royalty interest may be for a fee, term or defeasible term. For a 
discussion of term and defeasible term royalty interests, see Phillip E. Norvell, Defeasible 
Term Mineral and Royalty Interests, 24TH ANNUAL ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
INSTITUTE (1985). Also, for an examination of the nonparticipating royalty deed form that 
has been traditionally utilized in Arkansas, see Oliver M. Clegg, The Arkansas Royalty 
Deed: Questions and Answers, 21ST ANNUAL ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
INSTITUTE (1982). 
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cost-free. The nonparticipating royalty owner does not participate in the 
executive right, the right to execute oil and gas leases, or in bonus or delay 
rental payments.3 Oil and gas prospects burdened by non-participating 
royalty interests present two initial issues that the operator contemplating 
leasing and subsequent development should consider. As a preliminary 
step, non-participating royalty conveyances must be interpreted to 
determine the share of gross production that is conveyed. Central to 
determining the share of gross production conveyed is the issue of whether 
the interest created is a fractional share royalty or a fraction of royalty. This 
article will discuss the difference between a non-participating fractional 
share and a fraction of royalty and review the peculiar problems that beset 
the interpretation of royalty conveyances when determining which of these 
distinct interests has been created. 
Additionally, this article also will discuss the standard of care that the 
executive right holder owes to the non-participating royalty owner in 
negotiating the lease royalty. Likewise, the basis for imposing liability on 
an oil and gas lessee who secures an oil and gas lease from the executive 
right holder who violates the duty of care owed to the nonparticipating 
royalty owner will also be explored. The standard of care that the executive 
right holder owes to the non-participating royalty owner in negotiating the 
oil and gas lease may be an additional basis of liability for the oil and gas 
lessee. Compensatory and exemplary damages, or lease cancellation, may 
be incurred by the oil and gas lessee who negotiates the lease from a 
culpable executive right holder. 
II. The Difference Between The Fractional Share And The Fraction Of Non-
participating Royalty 
The difference between a non-participating fractional share royalty and 
a fraction of royalty is simple, yet illusive. First, a fractional share royalty 
entitles the owner to only that specified fractional quantum of gross 
production stated in the deed. In essence, the effect of a fractional share 
conveyance of royalty is to transfer “a fraction or percentage of gross 
production that stands as a free royalty.”4 The share of gross production that 
the fractional share is entitled to is fixed by the fractional size of the 
interest conveyed by the deed, regardless of the amount of royalty 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Wynn v. Sklar, 493 S.W.2d 439 (Ark. 1970); Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359 
(Ark. 1955); Arkansas Valley Royalty Co. v. Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Co., 258 S.W.2d 51 
(Ark. 1953). 
 4. 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 327.1 (1994). 
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contained in a subsequent oil and gas lease.5 For example, the language 
conveying “an undivided 1/16th of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals 
produced and saved,” entitles the royalty owner to a 1/16th share of gross 
production regardless of the fact that the landowner’s royalty reserved in 
the oil and gas lease is a 1/8th, 3/16th or 1/4th royalty.6 A fractional share roy-
alty interest does not participate in any overriding royalty reserved in an oil 
and gas lease that may be in addition to the landowner’s royalty.7 
Conversely, a non-participating fraction of royalty conveys that 
fractional share of royalty that is contained in the oil and gas lease.8 For 
example, a 1/2 of non-participating royalty, with an oil and gas lease 
providing for a 1/8th royalty, is entitled to a 1/16th part of gross production. 
Likewise, if the oil and gas lease provides for a 3/16th of royalty, a 1/2 of non-
participating royalty is entitled to 3/32nds of gross production. In effect, the 
fraction of the non-participating royalty’s share of production is not “fixed” 
but “floats” in accordance with the size of the landowner’s royalty con-
tained in the lease.9 In addition to the landowner’s royalty, the fraction of 
non-participating royalty also shares proportionally in any overriding 
royalty interest reserved in the oil and gas lease if the interest is a royalty.10 
Because the holder of the executive right negotiates the landowner’s royalty 
share in the oil and gas lease and thus determines the share of royalty that 
the fraction of non-participating royalty owner receives, the executive 
owner owes a duty of care to the non-participating royalty owner in 
establishing the landowner’s royalty. 
The question of whether a non-participating royalty conveyance creates a 
fractional share or a fraction of royalty presents an issue of construction 
teeming with complications. The fact that the standard landowner’s royalty 
in the oil and gas lease for approximately 50 years was a 1/8th share looms 
large in the confusion. This customary 1/8th share furnished the background 
in which non-participating royalty interests were created during that era. 
Therefore, a person wanting to reserve a share of the landowner’s 1/8th 
royalty, as for example 1/2 of that interest, could express it in either one of 
two ways: the reservation could be expressed as a fraction of royalty, for 
example 1/2 of the royalty, entitling the person to 1/16th share of gross 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Barret v. Kuhn, 572 S.W.2d 135 (Ark. 1978); Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1978). 
 8. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 327.2. 
 9. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 327.2. 
 10. See infra note 94. 
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production, or the reservation could be expressed as a straight fractional 
share, for example a 1/16th share of gross production, also entitling the 
person to 1/16th share of gross production. Thus, for many years, as a 
practical matter, a fractional share and a fraction of royalty were 
synonymous.11 In fact, as will be seen, many non-participating royalty 
interests were created by instruments that utilized both a fractional share 
and a fraction of royalty. One expression may be found in one clause of the 
deed, such as the granting clause, while the alternative expression appears 
in either a “subject to” or a “future leasing” clause. 
Over the last twenty years the landowner’s royalty in the oil and gas 
lease has increased to a greater fractional share, such as a 3/16th or 1/4th. 
Consequently, a fractional share or a fraction of royalty are no longer 
synonymous but instead yield different shares of gross production. The 
fraction of designation, created during the era in which the 1/8th landowner’s 
royalty was all but universal and was the background for the transaction, 
yields a greater share of production than its historic counterpart, the 
fractional share designation. 
To further complicate matters, some laypersons had difficulty with 
fractions in general, particularly during the old days when less of the 
populace was educated. Moreover, the distinction between these two 
different royalty designations is often slight, and some laypersons, as well 
as lawyers, simply fail to comprehend the difference. 
III. Delineating The Difference Between A Fractional Share And A 
Fraction Of Royalty 
The distinction between fractional share royalty interests and fraction of 
royalty interests may best be illustrated by examples from case law. A 
common example of a fractional share non-participating royalty is the grant 
of a fraction of gross production or its equivalent. For example, “an 
undivided 1/24th of all the oil, gas, and other minerals produced, saved and 
made available for market” was held to convey a fractional share royalty 
interest entitling the grantee to a 1/24th share of gross production.12 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Ernest E. Smith, Conveyancing Problems, State Bar of Texas Professional 
Development Program: Advanced Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Course, at G-l (1981) 
[hereinafter Smith 1], 
 12. Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). See also Hanson v. Ware, 
274 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Ark. 1955), wherein the granting clause to a 1919 royalty deed 
conveyed a “one-sixteenth part of all oil and gas produced and saved.” 
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The fractional share conveyance may also utilize a fraction in reference 
to “royalty” as a synonym for gross production. Thus, a reservation of “a 
1/16th royalty from any oil and gas produced” entitles the grantor to a 1/16th 
share of gross production.13 Similarly, a grant of “a fee royalty of 1/32 of the 
oil and gas” was held to create a fractional share 1/32nd interest in gross 
production.14 
Conversely, the common example of a fraction of nonparticipating 
royalty is the grant of “1/2 of royalty.”15 The share of gross production is the 
specified fraction of the amount of the oil and gas lease royalty. As has long 
been observed, the “fraction of royalty” designation is equivalent to a 
mathematical formula that determines the quantum of gross production 
involved.16 The term “of” that follows the fraction (1/2) and precedes the 
term “royalty” means “times” and requires the fraction to be multiplied by 
the lease royalty to determine the quantum of gross production. Thus, when 
the lease royalty is 1/8th, 1/2 of royalty equals 1/16th of gross production. Yet 
that same fraction of royalty equals 3/32nds of gross production when the 
lease royalty is 3/16ths. 
A fraction of royalty has also been expressed by language that indicates 
the fraction is an interest in the royalty. For example, a grant of a “one-half 
(1/2) interest in all royalties” was held to convey “one-half (1/2) of the 
royalty” reserved in the mining lease.17 Also, a deed reserving “one-half 
(1/2) interest in and to the royalty rights” was held to reserve 1/2 of the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Karaker v. Unknown Heirs, 434 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1966). In Karaker, the court was 
construing a reservation in a 1922 deed. The sole issue was whether the reservation reserved 
a 1/16th of gross production or only a 1/16th of a 1/8th royalty. The court found the reservation 
ambiguous. Moreover, the court admitted into evidence a 1924 oil and gas lease that 
provided that the lease royalty was to be divided one-half (1/2) equally between the grantor 
and grantee of the deed. The court held that the reservation was to a 1/16th of gross 
production as a non-participating royalty. In reaching this result, the court emphasized that 
the reservation stated 1/16th royalty of any oil and gas produced, as opposed to 1/16 of any 
royalty interest, noting that a distinction exists between the term “royalty” and “royalty 
interest.” 
 14. Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953). 
 15. See Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), wherein dicta noted 
that a grant of “one-fourth (1/4th) of the royalty” conveyed a “fraction of royalty” and the 
ultimate share of production accruing to the interest was “determinable upon the execution 
of some future lease.” Id. at 857. The grantee received 1/4th of the 1/8th lease royalty as well 
as 1/4th of 1/16th of the 7/8th overriding royalty reserved in a subsequent oil and gas lease. 
 16. It is accepted convention “that ‘of’ is the same as ‘times’ in a multiplication 
formula.” 6 W.D. Masterson, Jr., OIL & GAS REPORTER, at 1372 (1956) (discussing Minchen 
v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956)). 
 17. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enter., Inc., 645 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). 
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royalty to be paid under any existing or future lease.18 Similarly, a 
reservation of “an equal one-eighth (1/8th) of any royalty of all oil . . . [or] 
gas . . . developed on or received from said land” reserved a 1/8h of royalty, 
which due to the royalty in the lease being 1/8th, reserved a 1/8th of 1/8th, or a 
1/64th, share of gross production.19  
IV. The Problem Areas 
A. A Fraction of a 1/8th Royalty 
Some non-participating royalty conveyances have utilized a fraction of a 
1/8th royalty to fix the quantum of the royalty share. The effect is to create a 
fractional share royalty. For example, a grant of “1/2 of the 1/8th royalty 
(same being 1/16th of total production)” conveys a 1/16th share of gross 
production despite the fact that the lease royalty may be in excess of a 1/8th 
share.20 The plain meaning of the specific language utilized dictates the 
fractional share construction. After all, 1/2 of 1/8th equals a 1/16th share. The 
specific language of the grant or reservation precludes a construction of 
anything other than a fractional share of gross production. Thus, the courts 
give a literal interpretation to the fraction of 1/8th non-participating royalty 
which results in a fractional share construction. 
That result, however, has not gone unquestioned. Dean Ernest Smith has 
observed that the general intent of the parties to the conveyance of a 
fraction of a 1/8th royalty was to convey a fraction of whatever royalty share 
was subsequently provided for in the lease.21 
In essence, under Smith’s theory, the 1/8th fraction appearing in the 
formula was not only synonymous with the oil and gas lease royalty share 
but signified the lease royalty share, whatever that share subsequently 
became. Thus, a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty would be construed as a 1/4th of royalty 
or a fraction of royalty, entitling the royalty owner to share in lease royalty 
in excess of 1/8th. The hypothesis for Smith’s general intent for a fraction of 
royalty construction is the historical ubiquity of the oil and gas lease royalty 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937). 
 19. Nourse v. Kovacevich, 109 P.2d 999 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). 
 20. Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). In Helms, the grantee in 
the deed sued to recover a 1/16th share of a 1/16th of 7/8ths overriding royalty interest that had 
been reserved in the lease in addition to the 1/8th royalty share. In Texas, as noted in the case, 
overriding royalty is royalty. The court held that Helms was only entitled to a 1/16th of gross 
production. The court observed that Helms owned “a ‘fractional royalty’ of 1/16th of the total 
production, not a ‘fraction of royalty,’ determinable upon the execution of some future 
lease.” Id. at 857. 
 21. Smith I, supra note 11, at G-l. 
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as a 1/8th share and the probability that the parties never considered the 
possibility of a lease providing for a greater royalty share. Smith 
recognizes, however, that the specificity as to the quantum of royalty 
inherent in the fraction of 1/8th royalty conveyance, i.e., the specific intent, 
precludes any contradiction of such terms by a general intent based on 
historical facts or assumptions.22 Thus, despite his qualms, Smith 
recognizes that the fractional share construction will prevail as the fraction 
of 1/8th royalty formula. 
Nevertheless, cases exist which deal with deeds or reservations of a 
fractional share of 1/8th royalty which bear the suspicion that Smith’s 
general intent theory is not far off the mark. One such case is Canter v. 
Lindsey23 from the Texas Civil Court of Appeals. In that case, Dora Roberts 
owned the fee mineral estate to 17,712 acres of land. In 1935, she conveyed 
to M. C. Lindsey as follows: 
ONE FOURTH OF ONE EIGHTH (1/4 of 1/8) of all the oil, gas, 
and other minerals produced from the following described 
land . . . the interest herein conveyed being an equal one fourth 
of one eighth (1/4 of 1/8) part of all of the oil, gas, and other 
minerals when same has been produced from said land, and to 
such extent, such part of any and all future productions of such is 
hereby conveyed.24 
The deed also reserved to the grantor the right to all bonuses, delay 
rentals and executive rights. 
Thereafter, in 1941, Roberts executed the following deed to J. E. Mabee: 
That I, Dora Roberts, . . . do GRANT, SELL, and CONVEY 
unto the said J. E. Mabee, . . . , a three-fourths (3/4) interest, 
undivided, in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, on, in, 
and under the certain tracts, parcels and pieces of land . . . .25  
The next clause of the deed conveyed to Mabee all the executive, bonus 
and delay rental rights, “as well as all other benefits accruing thereunder,” 
to the remaining 1/4th interest. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 22. Smith I, supra note 11, at G-2. 
 23. 575 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). 
 24. Id. at 333. 
 25. Id. 
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That clause continued as follows: 
save and except the royalty payable under any such lease 
covering such 1/4th interest, all royalty accruing under any such 
lease on such 1/4th interest being payable to M. C. Lindsey, his 
heirs and assigns, who owns an undivided one-fourth (1/4) non-
participating royalty interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in 
said land . . . . 26 
The deed then recited that Lindsey did not own any executive, bonus, or 
rental rights, such rights having been retained by Roberts in Lindsey’s deed, 
and repeated that such rights were conveyed to Mabee who would then 
solely own all executive, bonus, and delay rental rights. As to royalty, the 
instrument concluded by stating that Mabee would own: 
the right to receive only three-fourths (3/4) of the royalty accruing 
under any such lease, or leases, the remaining one-fourth (1/4) 
interest in such royalty being owned by M. C. Lindsey, his heirs 
and assigns.27 
In 1973, an oil and gas lease covering part of the land was executed that 
provided for a 3/16ths royalty, and production was established on the lease. 
A declaratory judgment action was then instituted to determine the 
ownership of the 1/16th lease royalty share attributable to the 1/4th of royalty 
interest reserved in the Mabee deed that was in excess of the 1/8th royalty 
share. Predictably, all of the parties to the original conveyances were 
deceased, but the heirs and successors-in-interest of Lindsey, Mabee, and 
Roberts28 sought to recover the 1/16th royalty share.29 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. To facilitate the discussion, as in the appellate court opinion, the parties will be 
referred to as the principals, Lindsey, Roberts, and Mabee, as opposed to their successors-in-
interest. 
 29. To facilitate an understanding of the case, the calculation of the lease royalty shares 
pursuant to the theories of the different claimants appears below. 
Lindsey, the plaintiff, claimed a 1/4th of the 3/16th royalty, or 3/64th of gross production. 
He recognized the defendant, Mabee, as owning 3/4th of 3/16th or 9/64ths of gross production 
while Roberts, the intervenor, pursuant to Lindsey’s theory, was entitled to no royalty. 
Mabee, the defendant, claimed he was entitled to all royalty reserved under any lease in 
excess of 1/4th of 1/8th (1/32nd), with the ownership of the 3/16th lease royalty being as follows: 
(1) Lindsey owning 1/4th of 1/8th to equal fend share of gross production and (2) Mabee 
owning a full 3/16th minus Lindsey’s fend share, entitling Mabee to 10/64ths. Roberts, again, 
was entitled to no royalty. 
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Lindsey maintained that he acquired the excess 1/16th royalty share by 
virtue of the 1935 deed. Lindsey argued, in part, that the deed conveyed a 
1/4th of 3/16th, equal to a 3/64th, royalty share in production from the 1973 
lease. Lindsey prevailed at the trial court, but the Court of Appeals re-
versed. First, the court held the deed unambiguous and construed the scope 
of the conveyance to encompass only a 1/32nd fractional share non-
participating royalty. In effect, the court determined that the deed conveyed 
to Lindsey a fractional share 1/32nd royalty, not a 1/4th fraction of royalty. 
Thus, Lindsey was only entitled to a 1/32nd share of gross production 
regardless of the size of the landowner’s royalty contained in the 1973 
lease. The court observed: 
The Plaintiff became entitled to a 1/32nd royalty interest, but no 
more. That interest was established in 1935 and was absolute and 
independent of any royalty reserved in any future lease by the 
then holder of the executive rights.30 
In effect, the court in Canter literally interpreted the 1/4th of 1/8th royalty 
deed to convey a fractional share 1/32nd interest. 
In addition to the 1935 deed, Lindsey also claimed that the recitals in the 
1941 Mabee deed that described, albeit erroneously, his royalty share as a 
1/4th of royalty established his right to a 1/4th share of the 1973 lease royalty. 
The court rejected this argument for the following reasons. First, the recitals 
in the Mabee deed that described the royalty as a 1/4th share did not operate 
to grant Lindsey that interest because the Mabee deed lacked words of 
conveyance. Additionally, because the recitals in the Mabee deed were 
erroneous as to Lindsey’s title, the recitals could not supply a basis for an 
exception to the grant that would operate as a conveyance of an interest.31 
Finally, both of the Lindsey theories relating to the 1941 Mabee deed failed 
because they contravened the rule that a reservation in favor of a stranger to 
the title is void. 
Mabee, the grantee to the 1941 deed, claimed the excess royalty at issue 
on the theory that Roberts had conveyed to him everything which she 
owned and had not previously conveyed to Lindsey. The court rejected this 
argument noting that even though Roberts was mistaken as to Lindsey’s 
                                                                                                                 
Roberts, the intervenor, claimed 1/4th of any royalty in excess of 1/8th reserved on any 
lease (1/4th of 1/16th, or 1/64th). She recognized that Lindsey was entitled to 1/32nd of gross 
production and Mabee was entitled to 3/4ths of 3/16th or 9/64ths of gross production. 
 30. Canter, 575 S.W.2d at 335. 
 31. See Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957), which was cited in Canter, 575 
S.W.2d at 335. 
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interest under the 1935 deed, believing Lindsey owned a 1/4th of royalty 
when he in fact owned a 1/32nd royalty, the 1943 deed clearly and 
unambiguously reserved a 1/4th of the royalty from the conveyance to 
Mabee. In effect, Roberts retained that portion of the reserved interest that 
was not outstanding in another.32 Thus, as only 1/32nd was outstanding in 
Lindsey, entitling him to 2/64ths of the gross production, and Roberts had 
reserved 1/4 of royalty in the conveyance to Mabee, being 1/4th of 3/16ths, or 
3/64ths, of such production, she owned the difference, being a 1/64th share of 
gross production. 
When Canter v. Lindsey is considered in relation to Dean Smith’s 
general intent theory, one wonders if Dora Roberts believed that a 1/4th of 
1/8th royalty was identical to a 1/4th of royalty when she executed the two 
deeds. The court admitted that Roberts was mistaken as to the effect of the 
1935 deed when she executed the 1941 deed. Was she also mistaken in 
believing that a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty was conveyed to Lindsey, as opposed to 
a 1/4th of royalty? Or did she simply not believe that there was a distinction 
between the two? Did she think that the different formulas were 
synonymous and conveyed the equivalent share in production from a future 
lease? Roberts, as well as Lindsey and Mabee, may have labored under that 
delusion. In any event, no matter how convincing one might find Smith’s 
theory, the literal interpretation that results from a fractional share 
construction of a fraction of 1/8th royalty prevails, absent additional 
language or circumstances that dictate a different result.33 The plain 
                                                                                                                 
 32. The court noted that Roberts conveyed a 3/4th mineral interest to Mabee. As to the 
remaining 1/4th mineral interest, Roberts conveyed to Mabee the executive right and the right 
to bonus and delay rentals. Thus, Roberts owned the 1/4th mineral interest shorn of the 
executive right, right to delay rentals, right to bonus, and a 1/8th of royalty. Note that despite 
the fact that Roberts conveyed most of the incidents of ownership as to her 1/4th non-
participating mineral estate, she would only share in any benefits of mineral ownership in 
the event that the lease royalty was in excess of 1/8th. 
 33. In Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954), the court 
construed a royalty deed that granted a 1/4th of non-participating royalty as conveying only a 
1/4th of 1/8th royalty. Following the legal description, the 1/4th of royalty deed contained a 
clause referring to a prior deed “for all purposes.” The prior deed was the source of the 
grantor’s title that reserved to the grantor only an “undivided 1/2 of 1/8th royalty.” 
Subsequently, an oil and gas lease was executed providing for a variable royalty, a 1/4th 
royalty that under certain circumstances would increase to a 7/16ths royalty. The holding that 
the 1/4th of royalty deed conveyed only a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty was based on the following 
factors: (1) the usual lease royalty is a 1/8th royalty share and (2) it would be unjust to 
construe the deed to convey a 1/4th of royalty when the grantor only owned a 1/2 of 1/8th 
royalty, which was less than a 1/4th of royalty share to the potential 7/16th lease royalty. 
Therefore, the reference to the prior deed “for all purposes” referred to the 1/2 of 1/8th royalty 
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language of the formula evidences the specific intent that cannot be over-
ridden by a general intent derived from the historical background of the 
universality of the 1/8th lease royalty and a general assumption that the 
fraction 1/8th was intended to encompass any fraction of lease royalty. 
B. The Inconsistent Granting Clause: A Fraction Of and the Minimum 
Royalty Provision 
Brown v. Havard34 involved the construction of the following royalty 
reservation contained in a 1963 warranty deed: 
Grantors reserve . . . in perpetuity an undivided one-half non-
participating royalty (Being equal to, not less than an undivided 
1/16th) . . . .35 
Brown, the defendant, executed the deed in favor of the predecessors-in-
interest of the plaintiffs, Havard, et al. (Havard). The land was then subject 
to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty that was held during the 
secondary term by payment of shut-in-gas royalties on a gas well, the Gill 
No. 1. In 1973, Havard executed an oil and gas lease to M-Tex that 
provided for a 3/8th lease royalty and covered the entire tract except for the 
Gill No. 1 gas unit. M-Tex drilled four producing wells on the new lease. 
Havard brought a declaratory judgment action contending that Brown 
only reserved a 1/16th royalty in the M-Tex wells.36 Havard argued, inter 
                                                                                                                 
share owned by the grantor and disclosed the intention to convey to the grantee 1/4th of that 
1/8th royalty. 
Remuda illustrates the converse case. In Remuda, a 1/4th of royalty was construed as a 
1/4th of 1/8th royalty. However, this decision represents an instance in which additional 
language in a deed results in an interpretation of a fractional share or fraction of royalty that 
differs from the traditional construction. 
 34. 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980). 
 35. Id. at 940. 
 36. The royalty to be paid on the pre-existing gas well was also an issue. Havard alleged 
that Brown was only entitled to 1/16th of the proceeds from the gas well. Brown contended 
that he was entitled to 1/2 of the gross production from the gas well and 1/2 of the 3/8ths 
royalty from the M-Tex wells. The jury, based on extrinsic evidence, held that Brown was 
entitled to 1/16th of the production from any well. The trial judge found the deed 
unambiguous and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial judge 
determined that Brown was entitled to 1/2 of the production from the gas well and 1/2 of the 
3/8ths royalty from the M-Tex lease. Id. at 941. 
The court on appeal held the deed was ambiguous, in part, because Brown was awarded 
1/2 of gross production from the gas well but only 1/2 of the 3/8ths royalty from the M-Tex 
wells. Id. at 944. The dissent rejected the view that the difference in the trial judge’s award 
as to the share of production from the gas well and the oil wells could be a basis for finding 
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alia, that the deed was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence revealed that 
the parties only intended a reservation of a 1/16th royalty. Brown contended 
that the deed was unambiguous and reserved 1/2 of royalty, entitling him to 
1/2 of the 3/8ths lease royalty. 
The case was tried to a jury which found, based on extrinsic evidence, 
that Brown was only entitled to a 1/16th share of gross production. The trial 
judge, who found the deed was not ambiguous and that it reserved a 1/2 of 
royalty, entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and 
awarded Brown an undivided of the lease royalty, being 3/16ths of gross 
production. 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The court found the deed 
ambiguous and determined that the evidence supported the jury’s 
determination that the parties intended only a reservation of a 1/16th royalty. 
The Supreme Court of Texas, in a divided opinion, affirmed the appeals 
court. 
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court held the deed was ambiguous, 
thus permitting the admission of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of 
the parties. To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, a court applies es-
tablished rules of interpretation. If the deed remains susceptible to more 
than one interpretation, it is ambiguous. If only one meaning is clearly 
evident, the deed is not ambiguous. 
The majority predicated its decision that the reservation was ambiguous 
on the following construction. The deed provided: 
Grantors reserve . . . in perpetuity an undivided one-half non-
participating royalty . . . .37 
The majority determined this language would reserve a 1/2 royalty, being 
1/2 of gross production, and not 1/2 of the royalty. However, the parenthetical 
phrase, “Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th,” had “reference to 
a reservation of royalty.”38 
The parenthetical phrase contained the ambiguity. One interpretation of 
the language “Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th” was that it 
                                                                                                                 
ambiguity. Id. at 945. Instead, the dissent noted that Havard was the operator and owner of 
the gas well and, more importantly, the judge’s verdict as to the 1/2 share of gross production 
from the gas well was derived from a pre-trial stipulation made by the parties that agreed to 
that division of the production from that well. Based upon the stipulation as to the division 
of the gas well production, my analysis of the case will only consider the issue as to the 
division of the 3/8ths M-Tex lease royalty in order to facilitate and simplify the discussion. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 942. 
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reserved a 1/16th fractional share royalty. In effect, this interpretation leads 
to the conclusion that the parties intended to reserve a 1/2 of the 
conventional 1/8 royalty, “being equal to” a 1/16th royalty. Under this 
interpretation, the language “not less than an undivided 1/16th” merely 
provided for the contingency that if the lease royalty were ever reduced, the 
1/16th share would be received, insuring the reservation was a 1/2 of 1/8th 
royalty. 
The parenthetical phrase also supported an alternative interpretation of a 
reservation of 1/2 of royalties contained in future leases with a proviso that 
such share could not be less than 1/16th. This was the argument advanced by 
Brown. However, the opinion cryptically noted that the presence of the 
“comma” between the phrase “being equal to” and “not less than an 
undivided 1/16th” must be ignored to permit this latter construction. In other 
words, in the view of the majority, the presence of the “comma” in the 
parenthetical phrase grammatically precluded construing that language as 
intending to convey a 1/2 of royalties in future leases but not less than a 1/16th 
share. To achieve that construction based on that language, the comma or 
the grammatical construction must be ignored.39 After reviewing the 
extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial court, the majority affirmed the 
Texas Court of Appeals’ determination that Brown intended to reserve a 
1/16th royalty share. 
The dissenting opinion found the deed unambiguous and reserved to 
Brown 1/2 of royalties with a minimum royalty set at 1/16th. The dissent 
interpreted the parenthetical language as referring to the lease in existence 
at the time the deed was executed as well as to future leases. Under the 
existing lease, which had a 1/8th royalty clause, a reservation of 1/2 of 
royalties would be equivalent to a 1/16th royalty. The inclusion of the words 
“not less than an undivided 1/16th” only indicated that Brown contemplated 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The specific language of the majority opinion on the possible construction of the 
parenthetical phrase, “being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th,” is as follows: 
The parenthetical language itself is subject to more than one interpretation. One 
interpretation is that the parties intended to reserve 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th 
royalty, “being equal to” a 1/16th. The additional phrase “not less than” insured 
that the reservation was 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th royalty, and if the royalty 
were reduced, the Browns would still receive their 1/16th. On the other hand, the 
parenthetical language can be construed, as urged by the Browns, to reserve ½ 
of the royalties contained in future leases, providing further that the share must 
not be less than 1/16th. Such construction must ignore the presence of the 
“comma” between the phrase “Being equal to” and the phrase “not less than an 
undivided 1/16th.” 
Brown, 539 S.W.2d at 942. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
444 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
future leases on the property after the existing lease expired. In the event a 
future lease provided for less than a 1/8th royalty, Brown would still be 
entitled to a 1/16th royalty under the parenthetical clause. If the future lease 
provided in excess of a 1/8th royalty, Brown was to share in 1/2 of that 
royalty. The dissent’s view, in effect, was that the draftsman was merely 
exercising caution to guarantee a certain minimum royalty. 
Additionally, the dissent differed on the effect of the “comma” in the 
parenthetical phrase. The dissent noted: 
There is no language anywhere in the reservation clause to 
indicate that the Browns’ royalty was to be limited to a 
maximum of 1/16th: there is no language to the effect that 1/2 of 
royalties is to be equal to not more than 1/16th. The reservation 
does, however, unambiguously state that the Browns’ royalty 
interest is to be not less than 1/16th. Describing a variable amount 
as being equal to not less than 1/16 has the same result as 
describing it as equal to or greater than 1/16. The absence of a 
comma between the words “equal to” and “not less than” does 
not change this meaning. The deed reserves 1/2 of royalties, and 
the explanatory parenthetical sets a minimum of 1/16. The specific 
fractional equivalent to 1/2 of royalties may vary according to the 
lease so long as the Browns received their 1/16 minimum.40 
Brown v. Havard illustrates some of the perplexing problems 
encountered by lawyers and laypersons when construing mineral or royalty 
conveyances. Initially, one must be able to see the deed’s or reservation 
clause’s potential for ambiguity and susceptibility to different interpreta-
tions. However, as noted by the Havard majority opinion, even if a deed or 
reservation clause is susceptible to two constructions, it is not ambiguous if 
one construction clearly predominates. 
More importantly, the conclusion that the reservation is ambiguous may 
be plausible but not irresistible. After all, in Havard, the grantor’s 
reservation expressly specified a 1/2 non-participating royalty which was 
intended as a 1/2 of royalty reservation. Havard never argued otherwise. This 
specific reservation was followed by the parenthetical phrase in which the 
majority found the ambiguity. When the reservation was created, an oil and 
gas lease with a 1/8th royalty was in existence and the grantor could have in-
tended to reserve a perpetual non-participating royalty, mindful at the time 
that future leasing of the tract may occur. The grantor’s intent appears 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 946. 
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evident: the language of the parenthetical phrase was to insure that no less 
than a 1/8th lease royalty would ever devalue the grantor’s perpetual royalty 
interest. Did the grantor also intend the language “Being equal to” to 
confine his royalty share to a 1/16th? What would your answer be if you did 
not know that the jury had found that the parties intended the reservation of 
a 1/16th share of production?41 
If in fact Brown’s intent was to reserve a 1/2 of royalty interest, adding 
the parenthetical phrase only to insure that his royalty under any future 
lease would be a minimum of 1/16th share, then the minimum royalty 
provision that was drafted and designed to protect, in actuality, led to ruina-
tion. Although minimum royalty provisions may be a desirable addition to 
the fraction of royalty grant or reservation in order to protect the royalty 
owner from a low lease royalty negotiated by the executive owner, Havard 
points out the necessity that such clauses be clearly and unambiguously 
drafted so that the conveyance is to a fraction of royalty with a minimum 
royalty limitation. Otherwise, as may have been the case in Havard, that 
which was intended to help may in fact harm. 
C. The Horrors of the Double Fraction 
In Palmer v. Lide,42 the Arkansas Supreme Court was construing a 1927 
non-participating royalty deed that granted as follows: 
do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey . . . an undivided one-
eighth of one-eighth (1/8) interest in and to all of the oil gas and 
other mineral royalty . . . .43 
Oil production was subsequently established on the land under a lease 
providing for a 1/8th landowner’s royalty. Division orders were prepared 
which reflected that the deed conveyed a 1/8th of 1/8th royalty, a 1/64th share 
of gross production. The successors-in-interest of both the grantors 
(plaintiffs) and the grantees (defendants) executed the division orders and 
royalty was distributed to the parties on that basis until the operator 
suspended the amount subsequently disputed. Plaintiffs then sued to recover 
the suspended royalties and to determine their proper share of future 
royalties. 
The plaintiffs argued that the deed conveyed a 1/8th of 1/8th of royalty, 
with the latter being fixed by the lease at 1/8th. Thus, according to the 
                                                                                                                 
 41.  This is the pithy question posed by Dean Smith in his analysis of Havard. See 
Smith I, supra note 11, at G-4. The present author relies heavily on Smith’s analysis. 
 42. 567 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1978). 
 43. Id. 
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plaintiffs, the deed conveyed 1/8th of 1/8th of 1/8th, being a 1/512th share of 
gross production. The defendants argued that the deed, as reflected in the 
original division orders, conveyed 1/8th of 1/8th royalty, being a 1/64th 
production share. The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the trial court, 
interpreted the deed as conveying 1/8th of 1/8th of the royalty, which under 
the facts was a 1/512th share of gross production. Predictably, the court gave 
effect to the plain language of the grant. The language unequivocally 
conveyed a fraction (1/8) of a fraction (1/8) of a fraction (of royalty, being a 
1/8th share). The court observed that it simply “is not possible to interpret 
the unmistakably clear language of the deed to mean 1/8th of 1/8th of the total 
production.”44 
The defendants, who had been enjoying the royalty overpayment 
occasioned by the inaccurate division orders, also argued vainly that the 
plaintiffs were barred from claiming that the defendants were only entitled 
to receive a 1/512th production share by adverse possession, laches, lim-
itations or estoppel. The court, following Warmack v. Cross Co.,45 held that 
the overpaid royalty owner did not acquire title by adverse possession or 
acquiescence to the interest attributed to his ownership by a mistake of the 
party who disbursed the proceeds of production. In addition, the court held 
that one who erroneously received and kept overpayment for several years 
was not in equity entitled to a continuation of the error. 
One cannot quarrel with the construction of the “double fraction” 
formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide and by other courts.46 The 
specific intent of the parties, arising from the plain language of the formula, 
was unmistakable. 
However, one is haunted by the fear that the “horrors of the double 
fraction” may be the result of an error based simply on the parties’ selection 
of the wrong royalty deed form. Perhaps intending only to convey a 1/8th of 
1/8th royalty, equal to a 1/64th share of gross production, the parties 
mistakenly selected a printed form to convey a fraction of royalty and 
inserted in the blank the fraction 1/8th of 1/8th which was followed in the 
form by the salient of royalty language. Had the printed form selected been 
for a fractional share conveyance, no mistake would have occurred and the 
parties’ intent would have been effectuated. 
Obviously, that one simple and single word “of,” succeeded by the term 
“royalty,” was paramount in establishing the portion of the royalty share 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 296. 
 45. 377 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1946). 
 46. Harris v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1955); Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563 
(Tex. 1945). 
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conveyed. Yet that simple distinction was probably lost on many 
landowners, particularly in the early days of mineral conveyancing. That 
common error, like the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing,47 has likely 
occasioned the loss of fortunes in oil and gas royalties. 
D. The Large Fractional Share 
Fractional share non-participating royalties are peculiarly worthy of 
caution. The illustrative case is Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.,48 a Texas 
Supreme Court case, wherein the Gavenda family reserved a 15-year non-
participating royalty interest in a 1967 deed. The relevant part of the deed 
provided: 
an undivided one-half (1/2) non-participating royalty of all of the 
oil and gas in, to and under that [sic] produced . . . .49 
Subsequently, in 1978, the predecessor-in-interest to the grantee, who 
owned the executive right to the Gavendas’ non-participating royalty, 
executed an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th landowner’s royalty. 
Thereafter, Strata Energy, Inc. and others acquired the oil and gas lease by 
assignment and drilled two producing wells on the tract.50 
                                                                                                                 
 47. For a discussion of the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing, see Willis H. Ellis, 
Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 947 (1982). 
 48. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986). 
 49. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 690. 
 50. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957), provides 
another example of a large fractional share royalty. The case involved the construction of a 
reservation of a 49 year term royalty in which the first clause provided: 
Grantor expressly reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns, a one-fourth 
royalty in all oil, gas and other minerals in and under or hereafter produced . . .. 
Id. at 820. 
The last clause of the reservation indicated that the grantor’s reservation was non-
participating as to the executive right, bonus, and delay rentals. At the end of this clause was 
the following language: 
but if oil, gas or other minerals be produced in commercial quantities, then 
Grantor, . . . shall, during the term and existence of such reserved royalty, have 
and receive one-fourth part of such oil, gas and other minerals so produced as a 
royalty. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The successors-in-interest of the grantees, the plaintiffs, argued that the reservation 
created a 1/4th fraction of royalty, as opposed to a 1/4th fractional share royalty. Plaintiffs 
argued that if a “comma” were inserted after the language “so produced” and before the 
language “as a royalty,” then the words “so produced” would modify “produced in 
commercial quantities,” and the words “as a royalty” would modify “one-fourth part of such 
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Strata then hired an attorney to prepare a division order title opinion. The 
examining attorney erroneously interpreted the reservation in the 1967 deed 
as entitling the Gavenda family to a 1/16th royalty share, as opposed to a 1/2 
royalty share. Obviously, the attorney erroneously construed the reservation 
as a 1/2 of royalty, accruing 1/2 of the landowner’s royalty equal to a 1/64th of 
gross production. Instead, the deed reserved a royalty which entitled the 
Gavendas’ to a 1/2 of gross production. 
Based on the title opinion, Strata prepared division orders, which the 
Gavendas’ executed, that provided for the disbursement of their share of the 
proceeds on a 1/16th royalty share. Thereafter, when members of the 
Gavenda family died and the royalty ownership changed, transfer orders 
were prepared and executed reflecting the 1/16th royalty ownership. 
Apparently, during the administration of one of the estates, the error was 
discovered. The Gavendas’ revoked their division and transfer orders two 
days before the term interest expired. Thereafter, the Gavendas’ sued to 
recover the unpaid 7/16th royalty share, amounting to more than $2.4 million 
in unpaid royalties. In the litigation, the defendant lessees did not dispute 
that the deed reserved a 1/2 royalty interest, equal to a 1/2 share of gross 
production. Instead, they argued that the stipulation of ownership interest 
contained in the division orders estopped the plaintiffs from claiming any 
royalty in excess of the 1/16th interest. 
The Supreme Court of Texas, reversing the trial court and the 
intermediate appellate court,51 held that the defendants were liable for the 
unpaid royalties prior to the revocation of the division orders. Historically, 
estoppel had been applied based on the stipulation of ownership interest 
contained in the division order. Estoppel precluded the underpaid interest 
owner from recovering the deficiency from the operator who relied on the 
division order to distribute the proceeds of production.52 The court 
                                                                                                                 
oil, gas and other minerals.” Thus, the construction would be “1/4th royalty part of 
production,” or a 1/4th of royalty. 
The court observed that the “comma” could be inserted if necessary to arrive at the intent 
of the parties. However, the court determined that when read along with the entire 
reservation, the language at issue was clear and unambiguous. As to the grammatical 
construction, the court noted that the words “so produced” and “as a royalty” followed the 
same sequence as their respective antecedents. Further, the court explained that if the 
grantors were only to receive “1/4th of royalty,” there would be no reason for the inclusion of 
the article “a” that immediately preceded the word “royalty.” Therefore, a 1/4th fractional 
share royalty was reserved. 
 51.  683 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d in part, 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986). 
 52. The division order has historically authorized the purchaser of production, or the 
operator who disburses the proceeds of production, to receive the production and to 
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reasoned, however, that estoppel was not applicable when the operator 
made the error because a contrary result would allow the operator to profit 
unjustly from the operator’s own mistake. 
The court’s holding recognized that the attorney who misconstrued the 
royalty reservation was being sued for malpractice but, as the attorney was 
the agent of the defendants, his negligence was imputed to them. 
E. Inconsistency in the Granting, Subject To and Future Leasing Clauses 
Paralleling early mineral deeds, early non-participating royalty deed 
forms and, occasionally, formally drafted royalty reservations often 
contained multiple clauses in which different fractions could be inserted. 
The granting clause designates the portion of the estate conveyed in the 
deed. The designated “subject to” clause often recites that the interest 
conveyed was subject to an outstanding oil and gas lease and specifies the 
lease benefits that are covered and included in the grant.53 The “future-
lease” clause specifies the ownership interests that will be conveyed under 
future leases after the existing lease has expired.54 
                                                                                                                 
distribute the proceeds from the sale pursuant to the specified division of interest. 
Traditionally, if the proceeds are distributed pursuant to the division of ownership interest 
specified in the executed division order, an interest owner is estopped to assert a claim 
against the purchaser or operator for an inadequate payment. Dale v. Case, 64 So. 2d 344 
(Miss. 1957); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). See also 4 WILLIAMS 
& MEYERS, supra note 4, § 704.5 for citations to other authorities. 
In Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), the Supreme Court of 
Texas held that the estoppel arising from reliance on the division of ownership interest 
specified in the division order only precludes liability when the overpayment is made to a 
third-party and is not retained by the party disbursing the proceeds of production. 
 53. The “subject to” and “future lease” clauses, and the problems of interpretation 
resulting from conflicting fractions appearing in the various clauses, have been the subject of 
a number of law review articles. Included in the following cites are articles containing an 
analysis of the Texas cases and the infamous “two grant” or “multiple grant” constructions. 
See Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed 
Construction, 34 S. TEX. L.J. 73 (1993); Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the 
“Repugnant to the Grant” Doctrine, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 635 (1990); Bruce Kramer, The 
Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1993); 
Ernest E. Smith, The “Subject To” Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985) 
[hereinafter Smith II]. 
 54. The “covers and includes” language of the “subject to” clause typically specifies 
that the grant “covers and includes” the share of the lease benefits that the grantee is to 
receive pursuant to the outstanding oil and gas lease. Often the clause contains language that 
indicates the interest that the grantee will own when the outstanding lease terminates and it 
will also specify the share of the lease benefits the grantee will receive under a “future 
lease.” Even though the latter language is contained in the “subject to” clause, to facilitate 
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The practice of specifying the interests conveyed under existing and 
future leases in the “subject to” and “future-lease” clauses can be attributed 
to an early ill-fated Texas case. Caruthers v. Leonard55 held that the grantee 
of a fractional interest in a mineral estate that was subject to a pre-existing 
oil and gas lease did not receive a right to his proportionate share of the 
benefits under the lease. Caruthers was obviously bad law; its holding was 
inconsistent with a basic common law principle of conveyancing, namely 
that which is not specifically reserved from the grant is conveyed. 
Eventually, some forty years later, Caruthers was overruled.56 In the 
absence of Caruthers, a “subject to” clause is only required to prevent the 
grantor from breaching the covenants of title when the mineral estate 
conveyed is burdened by a pre-existing oil and gas lease. 
Deeds drafted to require the parties to fill in the blanks in separate 
clauses, some of which relate to the different incidents of mineral 
ownership such as the “subject to” and “future-lease” provisions, are 
obviously susceptible to errors that present perplexing issues of judicial 
interpretation. The focus of our inquiry is the problem which occurs when 
the clauses utilize both a fractional share and a fraction of royalty. 
However, the resolution of this issue is often intertwined with another 
common problem: construing mineral conveyances that contain 
inconsistencies between the “subject to,” “future lease” and granting 
clauses occasioned by the use of disparate fractions to describe the quantum 
of mineral interests or lease benefits conveyed and the royalty share 
attributable thereto. 
Disparate fractions in multiple provision deeds, which particularly 
plagued early conveyances, were likely a result of the widespread confusion 
relating to the difference in the shares of production attributable to 
respective mineral and royalty fractional shares. For example, a grant of a 
1/16th mineral estate only entitled the grantee to 1/16th of the conventional 
1/8th lease royalty, equal to a 1/128th production share. Similarly, a grant of 1/2 
of a mineral estate entitled the grantee to a 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th lease 
royalty, equal to a 1/16th royalty share. Failing to fully understand this 
distinction, parties intending to convey 1/2 a mineral estate and focusing on 
the 1/16th share of royalty may have erroneously inserted the 1/16th fraction in 
                                                                                                                 
the discussion, the “future lease” language will be treated as a separate and distinct lease 
provision. 
 55. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923). 
 56. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1943). 
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the granting clause drafted to convey a mineral estate, while inserting the 1/2 
fraction in the subject to or future lease clause.57 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Heyen v. Harnett, 679 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 1984), a 1984 Kansas Supreme Court case, 
best illustrates the problem. The court was construing a 1925 mineral deed in which the 
granting clause conveyed a 1/16th mineral estate and the subject to clause provided: 
if such land is covered by a valid mineral lease, the [grantee] . . . shall have an 
undivided 1/2 interest in the Royalties, Rentals, . . . . 
Id. at 1154. 
The plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of the grantor, argued that the deed was 
unambiguous; that it conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest as specified in the granting clause; 
and that it only entitled the defendants, the successors-in-interest of the grantees, to an 
undivided 1/16th of the royalties to a subsequent lease. The plaintiff further argued that the 
“subject to” clause only provided for 1/2 of royalties if the land was then subject to an 
existing oil and gas lease. Because there was no such lease, the plaintiff maintained that the 
contingency failed, rendering the clause inapplicable to convey any interest in royalties 
under subsequent leases. 
In opposition, the defendant argued that the deed was ambiguous and conveyed a 1/2 
mineral estate entitling the plaintiff to 1/2 of the royalties to be paid under the subsequent 
lease. Finding the deed ambiguous, and admitting extrinsic evidence that indicated that the 
parties had subsequently treated the conveyance as conveying a 1/2 mineral estate, the court 
held that the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral estate. In so doing the court made the following 
observation: 
It is not uncommon for parties to mineral deeds or reservations, where a royalty 
or mineral interest is conveyed or reserved subject to an existing oil and gas 
lease, to confuse the fractional interest conveyed or reserved. 
Id. at 1158 (quoting Shepard, Ex’x v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 26 
(Kan. 1962)). 
The court continued to note that: 
[a]s the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-eighth royalty 
reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests stems primarily from 
the mistaken premise that all the lessor-landowner owns is a one-eighth royalty. 
In conveying minerals subject to an existing lease and also assigning a 
corresponding fractional interest in the royalties received, mistake is often 
made in the fraction of the minerals conveyed by multiplying the intended 
fraction by one-eighth. Thus, if a conveyance of an undivided one-half of the 
minerals is intended, the parties will multiply one-half by one-eighth and the 
instrument will erroneously specify a conveyance of one-sixteenth of the 
minerals upon the assumption that one-sixteenth is one-half of what the grantor 
owns. An ambiguity is created because the instrument will also show that the 
conveyance of one-sixteenth of the minerals is meant to entitle the grantor to 
one-half of the royalty. Of course, an undivided one-half of the minerals is 
needed to carry one-half of any royalties reserved. 
Id. at 1158 (quoting Magnusson v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 731 P.2d 577, 583–84 (Kan. 
1958)). 
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1. The Texas Cases: The Decline, Fall and Resurrection of the Multiple 
Grant Construction 
The legacy of some early and highly criticized Texas cases58 that 
construed deeds as effectuating “two grants,” or more, continues to play a 
prominent yet equivocal role in the Texas case law which deals with 
inconsistencies between the granting, “subject to,” and “future lease” 
clauses in mineral and royalty deeds. Under the “two grant” approach, if the 
benefits conferred on the grantee in the “subject to” clause or the “future 
lease” clause differ from the benefits derived from the interest conveyed in 
the granting clause, the former clauses are construed as conveying such 
benefits, along with but independent of the latter clause. In effect, such a 
deed conveys not one but two or more grants. 
If the “two grant” construction prevails, then a royalty deed with a 
granting clause that conveys a “1/32nd of the oil and gas in and under and 
that may be produced and saved” and a “future lease” clause that recites 
that the grantee owns a “1/4th of the royalties” under “future leases” conveys 
two separate and distinct interests. The two interests conveyed are a 1/32nd 
fractional share royalty applicable to the existing lease and a “1/4th of 
royalties” under subsequent leases. The “1/4th of royalties” clause would 
entitle the grantee to its proportionate share of royalties in the future lease 
in excess of the conventional 1/8th landowner’s royalty. 
                                                                                                                 
 58. The “two grant doctrine” originated in the early Texas case of Hoffman v. Magnolia 
Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), in which 90 acres in fee were 
severed by deed from a 366 acre tract that was subject to an outstanding oil and gas lease. 
The “subject to” clause in the deed provided, inter alia, that the grantee was to receive “1/2 
of all oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said lease.” Id. at 
829 (emphasis added). 
The court construed the deed as executing two conveyances. The first conveyance 
conveyed the 90 acre tract in fee. The second conveyance, effectuated by the “subject to” 
clause, conveyed 1/2 of the royalties under the existing lease as to the entire 366 acre tract. 
The court reasoned that the “subject to” clause covered 1/2 of the royalty from the “said 
lease” and was not restricted to royalties accruing from production on the 90 acre tract. 
The construction in Hoffman has been universally condemned. The likely intent of the 
parties in inserting the “subject to” clause was to avoid the rule announced in Caruthers and 
to ensure that the grantee received 1/2 of the rentals and royalties as to the 90 acre tract 
conveyed. It seems unlikely that the parties would have utilized the “subject to” clause to 
convey 1/2 of the royalties under the entire 366 acre tract. 
For a discussion of the origin and applicability of the “subject to” clause, including 
Hoffman and the “two grant” theory prior to Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991), 
see Smith II, supra note 53. For a discussion that covers Hoffman and the Texas cases 
through Luckel and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991), see infra notes 
69–73. See also Burney, supra note 53, at 89–105 and Kramer, supra note 53, at 19–43. 
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Although some early Texas cases applied the “two grant” theory in some 
oil and gas deed construction cases,59 the theory was not applied to cases 
which involved conflicting fractions in mineral or royalty deeds. Instead, 
the traditional “four corners” rule of construction was utilized.60 This 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945), illustrates the applicability of the 
two grant doctrine. The Texas Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a deed with a granting 
clause purporting to convey a 1/16th of 1/8th mineral interest and a subject to clause reciting 
that it “covers and includes 1/16 of 1/8 of all the oil royalty” conveyed two distinct grants. Id. 
at 563–64 (emphasis added). The granting clause conveyed a 1/16th of 1/8th or a 1/128th 
minerals interest, and the “subject to” clause also conveyed a 1/16th of 1/8th of royalty or a 
1/1024th of gross production. 
The court determined that the fact that the first grant of 1/128th mineral interest, when 
taken in conjunction with the existence of a lease with a 1/8th landowner’s royalty would 
entitle the grantee to a 1/1024th share of production, an amount equal to the royalty share 
granted in the subject to clause, was irrelevant as to the existence of the “two grants.” 
Referring to the grant in the subject to clause, the court observed: 
The fact that it fixes the share in the present royalties the same as would have 
obtained by operation of law does not lessen its force and effect as a 
conveyance. As is often the case such payment of royalty might have been 
larger or smaller than a pro rata share. 
Id. at 565. 
In addition to Richardson, the other “two grant” theory cases that appeared after 
Hoffman v. Magnolia, 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), are Benge v. Scharbauer, 
259 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1953), and Woods v. Sims, 273 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1954), which like 
Hoffman, are factually unrelated to disparate fractions in the granting, “subject to,” or 
“future lease” clauses. For a discussion of these cases, see Smith II supra note 53; Burney 
supra note 53; Kramer supra note 53. 
 60. Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957), is viewed by some commentators 
as a milestone case that departed from the “two grant” theory in favor of the “four corners” 
rule of construction. The case involved the misconception of the difference between 
fractional shares of mineral and royalty interests. The granting clause purported to convey an 
“undivided 1/64th interest in the minerals” while the subject to clause included “1/8th of any 
royalties and 1/8th of said money rentals payable by the lessee.” The future lease clause 
provided the grantee would own: 
one-eighth of the lease interests and all future rentals . . . , he owning one-
eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas and other minerals . . . together with one-
eighth interest in all future rents. 
Id. at 905. The lease in existence expired and a subsequent lease was executed that provided 
for a 1/8th royalty. The issue presented was whether the grantee was entitled to 1/64th of 
royalty or a 1/64th royalty share under the subsequent lease. 
The Texas Supreme Court in a divided opinion held, inter alia, that the deed conveyed a 
1/8th of the minerals entitling the grantee to 1/8th of the royalty, or a 1/64th royalty share. The 
majority construed the deed from its “four corners,” viewing all of the clauses collectively, 
to ascertain the intent of the parties. First, the majority noted that the granting clause 
purported to convey a 1/64th mineral interest. However, the “subject to” clause indicated that 
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approach employs conventional rules of interpretation to ascertain the 
parties’ intent. 
However, Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast,61 a 1979 Texas Civil Appeals 
Court case, was decided under the “four corners” standard. Hindsight 
reveals that this decision was a harbinger of what was to come. The case 
dealt with the construction of a 1945 non-participating royalty deed in 
which the granting clause conveyed “a one-fourth (1/4th) interest in and to 
all of the . . . oil royalty, gas royalty, . . . .”62 A “future lease” clause also 
recited: 
It is distinctly understood and herein stipulated and agreed . . . 
that Grantee shall only receive one-fourth (1/4th) of the money 
royalty on sulphur . . . and one-fourth (1/4th) of the one-eighth 
(1/8th) royalty on oil, gas and all other minerals provided for in 
such lease or leases; and in the event Grantors, their heirs, or 
assigns, in the status of the fee owners of the minerals shall op-
erate and develop the minerals therein, Grantee, his heirs and 
assigns, shall own and be entitled to receive as a free royalty an 
undivided one-thirty-second (1/32nd) of all of the sulphur, oil, gas 
and other minerals produced, saved and sold off the 
premises . . . .63 
Apparently the land was not leased until 1972, when the plaintiffs, 
successors-in-interest to the grantors, executed an oil and gas lease that 
provided for a 1/6th royalty on oil and gas. Production was established on 
the lease. 
The plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the deed only 
conveyed a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty. Naturally, the defendants, the successors-
                                                                                                                 
the parties understood a 1/64th of the minerals to embrace a 1/64th royalty or 1/8th of the 1/8th 
royalty. The language of the “future lease” clause which provided that the grantee would 
own 1/8th of 1/8th of the minerals reflected the parties’ intent to convey a 1/8th of the royalty 
under future leases. Further, the language in the latter clause which provided that the grantee 
acquired “1/8th of the lease interest and future rentals” indicated that the grantee had the right 
to lease an undivided 1/8th interest and to receive 1/8th of the bonus and rentals. In essence, 
the parties intended that the grantee was to share in the same royalty under future leases as 
the existing lease and was conveyed a 1/8th mineral interest. 
For a more detailed analysis of Garrett as applying the “four corners” rule of 
construction and, more importantly, rejecting the “two grant” theory, see Burney, supra note 
53, at 95–106. 
 61. 587 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). 
 62. Id. at 807. 
 63. Id. 
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in-interest of the grantees, argued that the deed conveyed a 1/4th of royalty 
which entitled them to 1/4th of a 1/6th royalty share. The court held that the 
grantees were conveyed a 1/4th of royalty, and the defendants were entitled 
to a 1/24th share of gross production. 
In so holding, the court recited the standard rule of deed construction, the 
“four corners” rule. This rule requires that the court attempt to determine 
the parties’ intent by considering all language appearing in the deed and by 
harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to conflict. The 
court, however, also recited and applied other rules of construction. The 
rule construing the deed against the grantor if doubt exists as to the 
intention of the parties was applied by the court. Additionally, the court 
applied the rule indicating that if there is a “necessary repugnance” of 
clauses in the conveyance, the granting clause prevails. Thus, because the 
granting clause specified a grant of 1/4th of royalty while the future leasing 
clause restricted the royalty to 1/4th of 1/8th, the court determined that the 
granting clause prevailed and that the deed conveyed a 1/4th of royalty. 
Subsequently, in 1984, the Texas Supreme Court in Alford v. Krum64 
adopted the “repugnancy to the grant” theory to resolve inconsistencies 
between the granting, subject to, and future lease clauses. The case involved 
the construction of a 1929 deed in which the granting clause conveyed a 1/2 
of 1/8th mineral interest; the “subject to” clause provided for a 1/16th of 
royalty under the existing lease; and the “future lease” clause provided: 
in the event that the said above described lease for any reason 
becomes canceled or forfeited, . . . the lease interests and all 
future rentals on said land, for oil, gas and mineral privileges 
shall be owned jointly by . . . [Grantors and Grantees] . . . each 
owning a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in 
and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future 
rents.65  
The lease in effect at the time the deed was executed had expired. 
The trial court construed the deed as conveying a 1/16th mineral estate (1/2 
of 1/8th). The Texas Court of Appeals, emphasizing the language of the 
future leasing clause, reversed the trial court and held that the deed 
conveyed a 1/2 mineral estate. In a divided opinion, the Texas Supreme 
Court reversed the Texas Court of Appeals and held that the deed conveyed 
a 1/16th mineral estate. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
 65.  Id. at 872 (emphasis added). 
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The majority’s holding was premised on the rule of construction which 
states that, when irreconcilable conflict exists between the granting clause 
and other clauses in the deed, the granting clause prevails. The majority 
reasoned that when an irreconcilable conflict precludes a harmonization of 
internally inconsistent expressions of intent, the granting clause, which 
contains the “controlling language” and the “key expression of intent,” 
prevails. Further, the majority observed that the “well established” purpose 
of the future lease clause was to “explain or restate” the operative effect of 
the grant contained in the granting clause when the present lease terminates 
and future leases are executed. Finally, the majority emphasized that the 
language of the granting clause was clear and specific while the language of 
the future lease clause was unclear. 
The dissent, by Chief Justice Pope, offered the following analysis of the 
deed. The granting clause first conveyed a 1/2 of 1/8th or a 1/16th mineral 
estate. The “subject to” clause then recognized the existence of an 
outstanding oil and gas lease and expressly subjected the 1/16th conveyance 
to the outstanding lease. The dissent then noted that the majority had also 
held that the deed presently conveyed the “possibility of reverter” to that 
1/16th interest upon termination of the lease. Up to this point in the dissent’s 
analysis, the dissent did not disagree with the majority. 
Instead, the dissent’s disagreement related to the “future lease” clause. 
The dissent viewed this clause as conveying a “different and a greater 
estate” upon termination of the outstanding lease. According to the dissent, 
“the ridgepole that divides the rights conveyed before reverter from those 
conveyed after the reversion” is the language that provides, upon 
cancellation of the outstanding lease, “the lease interests ‘and all future 
rentals on said land [should] be owned jointly . . . by the grantors and 
grantees . . . each own[ing] a one-half interest in the oil, gas and other 
minerals.’ ”66 The dissent further noted that there was no ambiguity in a 
deed that granted a 1/16th mineral estate so long as there was an outstanding 
lease and a 1/2 mineral estate upon the lease’s termination. The dissent 
explained that the fractions were different for a good reason.67 
Even though the deed was construed to contain “multiple grants,” the 
dissent also emphasized the applicability of the “four corners” rule of 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 874. 
 67. Id. at 875. Although the dissent did not elaborate on the “good reason,” I would 
speculate that a 1/16th mineral estate subject to a lease that yields or may yield a 1/16th of 1/8th 
royalties may be of equal or greater value to an undivided 1/2 mineral estate after the lease 
expires when prospective royalties or bonuses are speculative. 
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construction.68 More important are the characteristics of these multiple 
grants recognized by the dissent. First, the conveyance of a mineral estate 
which fluctuates in size according to time was recognized by the dissent. 
Second, the dissent recognized the grant of an undivided 1/16th interest when 
the land was burdened by an outstanding lease. Third, a subsequent grant of 
an undivided 1/2 interest when the lease expired was recognized by the 
dissent.69 
Two points emerge from the Alford decision. One is that the majority 
adopted the “repugnant to the grant” rule of construction. This rule provides 
that the granting clause prevails over the “subject to” and “future lease” 
provisions when an irreconcilable conflict between former and latter 
clauses exists. This rule has some advantages, namely simplicity of 
application and certainty of title. Many deeds with disparate fractions as to 
mineral or royalty interests arising from the inclusion of a “subject to” or 
“future lease” clause do present irreconcilable conflicts which are impossi-
ble to internally harmonize with the granting clause. Thus, by applying this 
rule, a title examiner often can determine the scope of the conveyance 
without resort to litigation. 
The problem with resolving the issue through application of the 
“repugnant to the grant” rule of construction is that the result achieved may 
not reflect the intent of the parties. Under the “repugnant to the grant” 
construction, the intent is ascertained by glorifying the granting clause over 
another clause in the deed. In fact, the language contained in the granting 
clause may be less dispositive as to the intent of the parties than the 
language found in another clause. The reign of the Alford decision was 
short-lived, however.70 In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court in Luckel v. 
                                                                                                                 
 68. The opinion also cited and endorsed Garrett v. Dils, 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957). 
For a discussion of Garrett, see supra note 60. 
 69. See Burney, supra note 53, at 93. 
 70. During its short reign, the rule was applied in two appellate cases. In Hawkins v. 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), the granting clause conveyed 
a 1/32nd fractional share royalty while the “future lease” clause specified a 1/4th mineral 
estate. The granting clause conveyed a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty and the future lease provision 
specified a 1/4th mineral estate upon termination of the existing lease. The holding in Alford 
was followed and the granting clause prevailed resulting in the deed only conveying a 1/32nd 
royalty share. Hawkins provides a detailed and lucid account of the evolution of the “two 
grant” and “repugnancy to the grant” theories. 
In Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), the granting clause 
specified a 1/2 of royalty while the “subject to” and “future lease” clause specified a 1/16th 
royalty. The subsequent oil and gas lease provided for a 1/6th landowner’s royalty. Again, 
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White,71 another divided opinion, reversed the “repugnancy to the grant” 
rule of construction and specifically overturned Alford. 
Luckel involved the construction of a 1935 royalty deed. Mayes, the 
grantor, conveyed a royalty interest to Luckel by a deed in which the 
granting, habendum, and warranty clauses recited that a 1/32nd fractional 
share royalty was conveyed. The “subject to” and “future lease” clauses 
stated that the grantee was entitled to receive “1/4th of any and all 
royalties.”72 When the deed was executed, the land was subject to an oil and 
gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty that subsequently expired. Many years 
later, the land was subject to numerous leases, some of which provided for 
a 1/6th royalty. A declaratory judgment action was brought to determine if 
the successors-in-interest of the grantee, Luckel, were entitled to a 1/32nd or 
a 1/4th of 1/6th share of gross production from the excess royalty clauses. 
The majority opinion applied the “four corners” rule of construction. 
This rule requires the court to ascertain the intent of the parties by 
attempting to harmonize all parts of the deed and to only strike down a part 
of the deed when its effect is destroyed by an irreconcilable conflict with 
another part of the instrument. The Luckel majority ascertained the parties’ 
intent by harmonizing the conflict between the granting clause and the 
“future lease” clause. The court accomplished this by determining that the 
granting clause conveyed a 1/32nd interest (or 1/4th of the royalty under the 
existing lease) until the existing lease expired and that the “future lease” 
clause presently conveyed the possibility of reverter as to 1/4th of royalties. 
Thus, as to future leases, the latter clause conveyed a 1/4th of the total 
reserved royalty. Because the harmonization of the Mayes-Luckel deed 
conflicted with the construction of the deed in Alford, the latter case was 
expressly overruled. The court further held that the outright grant of a 1/32nd 
fixed royalty in the granting clause did set the minimum of the royalty for 
the 1/4th royalty conveyed pursuant to the “future lease” clause. 
                                                                                                                 
following Alford, the granting clause prevailed. Thus, the deed conveyed a 1/2 of royalty 
entitling the grantees to a l/12th production share. 
 71. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Ark. 1991). 
 72.  The deed also contained a clause that recited that it was “understood . . . that Mayes 
is the owner of one-half of the royalties to be paid under the terms of the present existing 
lease, the other one-half having been previously transferred by her to her children, and by 
the execution of this instrument, . . . Mayes conveyed one-half of her one-sixteenth (1/16th) 
royalty now reserved by her.” Id. at 461. 
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Luckel v. White resurrected the “two grant” doctrine in Texas deed 
construction.73 Although the language of the “four corners” rule of 
construction which requires the court to harmonize all clauses of the 
instrument if possible was present in the court’s opinion, the Luckel court’s 
recognition of and emphasis on the two separate and distinct grants 
emerging from the granting clause and the “future lease” clause is 
inescapable. The court determined that because the granting clause 
conveyed a 1/32nd fractional royalty share under the existing lease and the 
“future lease” clause conveyed a 1/4th of royalty as to the possibility of 
reverter which would become possessory apparently upon the execution of 
the future lease, a conveyance of simultaneous interests occurred.74 The 
                                                                                                                 
 73. The conclusion that Luckel v. White represents a return to the “two grant” mode of 
construction by the Texas Supreme Court is reinforced by Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 
S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991), a case decided the same day as Luckel. There, the issue involved 
the construction of a 1918 mineral deed that had been executed when the land was then 
subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty. The deed contained a granting 
clause conveying a 1/16th mineral interest and a “future lease” clause that provided, inter alia, 
that if the existing lease terminated without production, the grantee herein or his assigns “are 
to have . . . under this conveyance an undivided 1/2 of all the oil. [sic] gas or other 
mineral . . . and it is the intention of the grantors herein that in the event said lease is 
forfeited, then in that event the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one half of all 
such minerals.” Id. at 468. Apparently, the lessee drilled a producing well on the assumption 
that the deed only conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest and the accounting as to a cotenancy 
would only be on a 1/16th net profits basis. 
The plaintiffs, the successors-in-interest to the grantee, argued that the deed conveyed a 
1/2 mineral interest and sought an accounting on a 1/2 net profits basis. The court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and applied Alford, holding that the deed, pursuant to 
the granting clause that controlled the inconsistent “subject to” clause, only conveyed a 1/16th 
mineral interest. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that the granting clause 
conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest while the “subject to” clause simultaneously conveyed a 
7/16th interest in the possibility of reverter in the mineral estate. Thus, when the existing lease 
expired, the grantee owned a 1/2 fee mineral estate. As a result, the lessee had to account on a 
1/2 net profits basis. Although noting that the case had been overruled in Luckel, the court in 
Jupiter Oil distinguished Alford on the basis that the deed in Jupiter Oil unambiguously 
granted a 1/16th fee mineral interest and a 7/16ths interest in the possibility of reverter to the 
mineral estate. 
To fully comprehend the “two grant” analysis, Jupiter Oil should be compared with 
Heyen v. Harnett, 679 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 1984), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court reached 
the same result on a different theory. For a discussion of Heyen, see supra note 57. 
 74. The court opined that the only difference between the deed in Alford and the deed in 
Luckel was that the former was a mineral deed while the latter was a royalty deed and that 
this distinction was immaterial. Thus, deeds involving disparate mineral and royalty 
fractions are to be construed by the Luckel standard. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463. 
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interests differed only as to the share conveyed and the time in which the 
interests were to become possessory. 
This determination is a rather sophisticated theory as to the intent of the 
parties to a 1935 royalty deed. The criticism of Luckel v. White, which is 
the enduring criticism of the “two grant” theory, is that it is unlikely the 
parties intended two separate grants in the deed. As stated by the dissenting 
opinion: 
The oft-repeated expression that a grantor has the power to 
convey by one instrument different interests in the possibility of 
reverter and under the subsisting lease should not obscure the 
fact that very few grantors really intend to convey interests of 
different magnitude.75 
The flawed theory of Luckel does not necessarily make the result wrong. 
The effect is the same as if the deed had been construed against the grantor. 
However, the dissent disagreed with the result as well as the “two grant” 
rationale. The dissent would have taken judicial notice of the fact that the 
standard lease royalty in 1935 was a 1/8th share. Thus, the parties did not 
then contemplate that a 1/4th of royalties might not always equal a 1/32nd 
production share. The granting clause intended to convey a permanent grant 
of a 1/32nd royalty interest. Under this view, the “future lease” clause’s “1/4th 
of royalties” was used only to extend the 1/32nd production share to future 
leases. 
Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the resurrection of the “two grant” 
doctrine to mineral and royalty conveyances, no one mourned the loss of 
Alford, except of course title examiners who determined ownership on the 
basis of the “repugnancy to the grant” theory and their clients who made 
investments in mineral and royalty titles in reliance on Alford. 
2. The Arkansas Cases 
Barret v. Kuhn,76 is the first Arkansas Supreme Court case construing a 
non-participating royalty deed that contained both a fractional share and a 
fraction of royalty. The royalty deeds at issue were executed in the 1940’s 
when there was no production on the land. The deeds were titled “Royalty 
Deeds.” The term “non-participating” was printed underneath the title. The 
granting clause provided: 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 466. The dissent was quoting from 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, 
supra note 4, § 340.2. 
 76. 572 S.W.2d 135 (Ark. 1978). 
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do hereby grant . . . an undivided one sixty-fourth (1/64) interest 
in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and upon 
the following described lands . . . .77  
Following the granting clause was a “minimum royalty”78 clause that the 
court referred to as a “royalty” clause: 
Provided, that the grantors herein expressly covenant with the 
grantee that no oil and gas mining lease shall ever be executed 
covering the above land, or any part thereof, that shall reserve to 
the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns, as royalty, less than 
one-eighth of all of the oil and gas produced and saved from said 
land—and this covenant shall be deemed a covenant running 
with the land.79 
Following the “minimum royalty” clause was an “intention” clause 
which the court also treated as part of the “royalty” clause: 
It is the intention of the parties hereto that the grantee herein, its 
successors or assigns, shall be entitled to receive hereunder one-
eighth of all oil and/or gas run to the credit of the royalty 
interest reserved under and by virtue of any oil and gas mining 
lease now in force and effect . . . , and under any oil and gas 
mining lease hereafter executed . . . .80 
Additionally, after the royalty clause there was a “production” clause: 
and in any event the grantee herein, its successors or assigns, 
shall be deemed the owner of and shall be entitled to receive one 
sixty-fourth of all oil and gas produced and saved from said 
land . . . .81 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the grantors, and 
owners of the executive right, executed oil and gas leases that provided for 
overriding royalties of either 1/8th or 1/16th in addition to a 1/8th landowner’s 
royalty. After production was established on the land, division orders were 
prepared that provided for the owners of the non-participating royalty, the 
grantees, to share in the overriding royalty as well as the lease royalty. 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Barret, 572 S.W.2d at 137. 
 78. The court referred to the clause as a “royalty” clause. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
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Litigation ensued to determine the proper division of the royalty and 
overriding royalties between the plaintiffs and defendants. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the chancellor, 
held that the nonparticipating royalty owners were only entitled to a 1/64th 
share of production which precluded their participation in the overriding 
royalty. The court reasoned that the granting clause, as further evidenced by 
the language of the “production clause,” conveyed only a 1/64th interest in 
the oil, gas and minerals produced. This interpretation clearly limited the 
claim of the nonparticipating royalty owners because if these royalty 
owners were to participate in the overriding royalty interest, they would 
receive more than a 1/64th interest. In effect, the court construed the deed as 
granting a fractional royalty interest. 
The rationale for this result can be premised on the applicability of the 
rule of construction which provides that the granting clause, specifying the 
fractional share, controls over the inconsistent “royalty clause,” with its 
fraction of royalty language. In effect, the “repugnancy to the grant” rule of 
construction was applied. But the case can also be read as holding that the 
fraction of language in the “royalty clause” was only intended by the parties 
to permit the royalty owners to participate in the 1/8th lease royalty.82 
Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Venable,83 a 1993 Arkansas Supreme Court 
case, also involved the construction of nonparticipating royalty deeds 
containing conflicting fractional share and fraction of royalty clauses. 
Because the deeds are identical in form, differing only as to the fractional 
shares conveyed, the discussion will focus exclusively on one deed, the 
“Royal” deed. 
The deed was executed in 1939 while the lands were subject to an 
existing oil and gas lease, the Tissue lease, that provided for a 1/8th royalty. 
The deed contained the following granting clause: 
the grantee . . . shall at all times subsequent to the execution of 
this instrument, receive a (13/1920ths) . . . part of all oil, gas and 
other minerals produced and saved from the above described 
land, . . . which provision and agreement is a covenant which 
shall run with the land . . . .84 
                                                                                                                 
 82. This reading of Barret is premised on the court’s articulation of the issue as to 
whether the “1/8th of royalty” language in the royalty clause permitted the royalty owners to 
share in “all royalty revenue” or the “usual 1/8th royalty.” Id. at 136. 
 83. 850 S.W.2d 302 (Ark. 1993). 
 84. Anadarko, 850 S.W.2d at 303. 
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The deed then contained the following subject to clause which the court 
described as a “second” granting clause: 
It is understood that this land is encumbered with an oil and gas 
lease, executed by J.G. Tissue, a widower as Lessors, to Record 
Owners as Lessee, on — , which lease is recorded in Book — , 
at Page — , . . . . 
 And for the same consideration the Grantors do hereby 
bargain, grant, sell, convey and set over onto the Grantee an 
undivided (13/240ths) . . . part of all royalties on oil or gas 
produced from the above described land during the term of said 
lease, or any extension thereof.85 
In the 1980’s, sometime after the expiration of the Tissue lease, the 
mineral owners executed oil and gas leases that provided for a 3/16th 
royalty.86 The defendant, Anadarko Petroleum Co., the lessee, drilled 
producing wells on the leased lands. In 1983, the plaintiffs, the successors-
in-interest of the grantees, executed division orders in favor of the 
defendant. The defendant was disbursing the proceeds from production and 
had calculated their royalty share as a straight 13/1920th share of production 
which was equivalent to payment on a 1/8th royalty basis. 
In 1991, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in chancery court to establish 
their right to participate in the royalty on a 3/16th basis. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court, affirming the holding of the chancellor below, interpreted 
the 1939 deed as granting a fraction of royalty which permitted the plain-
tiffs to share in the royalty on a 3/16ths basis. 
The court’s holding was premised on two bases. First, the portion of 
royalty granted, in the deed had to be determined by reading the “first” 
granting clause which granted a straight fractional share in conjunction 
with the “second” granting clause which granted a fraction of royalty. In so 
doing, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the fraction of 
royalty contained in the second granting clause was merely “explanatory,” 
describing the scope of the fractional share conveyed in the first granting 
clause. The court reasoned that the language of the second granting clause 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. The opinion alternatively describes the royalty share at issue as an overriding 
royalty and as a lease royalty share. For purposes of this discussion, I have assumed that the 
3/16th share of royalty was a landowner’s royalty share. 
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“utilized all the terms of art of conveyance” and granted an “additional 
fractional one-eighth of” that was initially conveyed in the lease.87 
Additionally, the defendant argued that the language of the second 
granting clause, “during the term of said lease or any extension thereof,” 
indicated the parties did not contemplate that the clause would be 
applicable to “future leases.” The court rejected that argument and affirmed 
the chancellor’s finding that the subsequently executed oil and gas leases 
were an “extension” of the previously expired Tissue lease. Therefore, 
subject to the second granting clause, the grant of a fraction of royalty 
required payment of royalties on the 3/16th basis. 
Despite the fact that the deed contained two granting clauses (the court 
emphasized and interpreted the second granting clause as intending to 
effectuate a conveyance), the case does not follow the “two grant” theory of 
Luckel v. White. In effect, by applying the “four corners” rule of con-
struction, the court found that the parties to the conveyance intended the 
latter fraction of “royalty clause” to control over the former fractional share 
clause. 
Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff’s execution of the division 
order, which calculated their royalty share on a 1/8th basis, did not preclude 
recovery from the defendant for the underpayment occasioned by the failure 
to pay royalty on the 3/16th basis. Although the court recognized the general 
rule that the purchaser of production may rely on the division order in 
making payment to the interest owners and not be liable in tort or contract 
for underpayment, the court refused to apply the rule for three reasons. 
First, the division order did not specifically indicate plaintiff’s ratification 
of the calculation of his ownership share or waiver of the right to challenge 
the calculation of his ownership share. Second, plaintiff’s lack of 
knowledge of the 1980 leases providing for the 3/16th royalty share prior to 
filing suit precluded applicability of the doctrine of estoppel and laches. 
Third, the record was devoid of any evidence regarding any payments made 
by Anadarko that interjected the rights of innocent third parties.88 
The court’s holding and rationale as to the failure of the division order to 
protect an operator paying royalty pursuant to its terms are difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
 87.  Anadarko, 850 S.W.2d at 306. 
 88. The court also held that the plaintiff’s action was not time-barred. Thus, the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover for the deficiency that accrued from the date of the execution of the 
division order in 1983. The statute of limitations applicable to division orders, Ark. Code 
Ann. § 16-56-111 (1987) which prescribes a five year limitations period for actions relating 
to written contracts, was tolled by the “partial payments,” i.e., the underpayment. Anadarko, 
850 S.W.2d at 307. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/6
2017]        Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty 465 
 
 
determine from the language of the opinion. One would assume from the 
facts that Anadarko was making the excess royalty share payment, a 1/16th 
share, to the owners of the mineral estate who were burdened by the 
plaintiff’s non-participating royalty interest. If so, pursuant to Gavenda, the 
operator was not unjustly enriched and should not have been liable for the 
period prior to plaintiff’s revocation of the division order according to 
traditional theory.89 
V. The Duty Of Care The Executive Right 
Owes To The Non-Participating Royalty Owner 
The problem that peculiarly90 haunts non-participating royalty interests 
to a fraction of royalty91 is that the owners do not participate in the leasing 
of the land which determines the quantum of lease royalty that they will 
receive from production. The owner of the executive right to the mineral 
estate negotiates and executes the oil and gas lease which fixes the amount 
of bonus, delay rentals and royalty to be paid under the lease. Thus, absent 
a judicial standard regulating the conduct owed by the owner of the 
executive right to the non-participating royalty owner, the latter would be at 
the mercy of the former as to the share of royalty received under the lease. 
Typically, but not always,92 the owner of the mineral estate burdened by 
the non-participating royalty interest owns the executive right, as well as 
the right to the bonus and delay rental payments. Additionally, the mineral 
owner may also own the remaining share of royalty, if any, which has not 
been severed by prior non-participating royalty conveyances. An inherent 
conflict will exist between the mineral owner, who owns no interest or a 
partial interest in the royalty, and the non-participating royalty owner over 
the negotiation of the lease terms. The non-participating royalty owner will 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See the discussion at supra notes 48–53. 
 90. For a discussion of the myriad instances in which the requisite standard of care that 
the executive rights owner owes to the non-executive interest holder is applicable, see 2 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339. 
 91. The same problem exists to grants or reservations of “all of the royalty,” a phrase 
which encompasses all of the landowner’s lease royalty. To facilitate the discussion as to the 
standard of care, the reference to the fraction of royalty includes the “all of the royalty” 
conveyancing phenomena. 
 92. A “naked” executive right, entitling the holder thereof to the development and 
leasing rights, may be severed in fee from the mineral estate without the executive rights 
holder owning any other interest in the mineral estate. The ownership of the non-executive 
interest is to a “non-participating mineral estate.” See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW 
OF OIL AND GAS §§ 2.2 and 2.7(H) (West 3d ed. 1992). 
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want the maximum lease royalty. The mineral owner, however, has the 
incentive93 to negotiate for a reduced lease royalty to maximize bonus94 and 
delay rental payments. Likewise, looking for a future leasing opportunity 
and an additional bonus, the mineral owner may bargain for a lower royalty 
to obtain a shorter primary term. Finally, if the mineral owner also owns the 
surface, the lease royalty may be sacrificed for surface damage or non-
development clauses. 
The protection of the non-participating royalty owner lies in the standard 
of care imposed on the owner of the executive interest when negotiating 
lease benefits on behalf of the executive and non-executive interests.95 The 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Further complicating the applicability of the requisite standard of care, the executive 
holder may be motivated to negotiate for a reduced royalty share in an attempt to acquire a 
shorter primary term that may yield additional leasing opportunities with another bonus, 
surface damages, or non-development clauses. For a general discussion, see Ernest E. Smith, 
Implications of a Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 
TEX. L. REV. 371, 386–88 (1985) [hereinafter Smith III]. 
 94. An additional complication is the fact that “bonus,” the consideration paid to the 
mineral owner for executing the oil and gas lease, need not be paid, as it typically is, in the 
form of a cash payment. Any consideration may be paid as bonus, including a share of 
production, such as an overriding royalty interest or a production payment. When the lease 
benefits include a share of production, in addition to the landowner’s royalty share, the issue 
presented is whether the share of production is “bonus” to be paid to the mineral owner or 
“royalty” to be paid to the royalty owner. 
Two differing views exist in the case law. The Texas cases determine whether a share of 
production is bonus or royalty solely by whether the interest reserved has the generally 
accepted characteristics which define bonus or royalty. If the share of production is paid 
over the life of the lease, it is royalty. If it is a sum certain to be paid out of production, it is 
bonus. The parties’ express designation as to whether the interest is bonus or royalty is not 
controlling under Texas law. Thus, in Griffith v. Taylor, 291 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1956), 
the reservation in an oil and gas lease of a 1/16th share of gross production to be paid over the 
life of the lease that expressly stated that it was “in addition to the royalties . . . , as 
additional consideration and bonus royalty” reserved a royalty interest. See also Lane v. 
Elkins, 441 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). Texas has consistently held that the typical 
overriding royalty reservation in an oil and gas lease is royalty that is to be paid to the 
royalty owner. 
In Oklahoma, the parties’ designation in the lease as to whether the interest is bonus or 
royalty is determinative. Therefore, the intent, and not the characteristics of the interest 
reserved, is conclusive as to whether a production share granted in addition to royalty is 
bonus or royalty. The basis of the Oklahoma rule is Sykes v. Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416 
(Okla. 1957), wherein the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a share of production in 
excess of a 1/8th royalty intended by the parties to be a part of the consideration for the 
execution of the lease is bonus. 
 95. For a citation to the extensive literature on the duty that the executive owes the non-
executive interest in negotiating the oil and gas lease, see Joshua M. Morse & Jaimie A. 
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evolution of that standard has not been uniform or without controversy.96 
The prevailing standards have been the traditional “utmost fair dealing” 
standard, sometimes referred to as the “prudent landowner” standard, and 
the “fiduciary” standard originating in the 1985 Texas case of Manges v. 
Guerra.97 
A. The Utmost Fair Dealing Standard 
The “utmost fair dealing”98 standard measures the duty the mineral 
owner owes to the non-participating royalty owner in executing the oil and 
gas lease. This standard is what a “reasonable prudent landowner,” owning 
the full mineral fee and not burdened by the outstanding non-participating 
royalty interest, would have done under the circumstances. The “utmost fair 
dealing” standard has traditionally been viewed as an intermediate standard 
between an unduly high fiduciary duty and an insufficiently low duty of 
good faith.99 The “utmost fair dealing” standard is premised on an implied 
                                                                                                                 
Ross, New Remedies for Executive Duty Breaches: The Courts Should Throw J.R. Ewing 
Out of the Oil Patch, 40 ALA. L. REV. 187, 188 n.3 (1988). 
 96. For a discussion of the various labels used to describe the duty that the executive 
owner owes to the non-executive owner, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2. 
Many of the descriptive terms, such as “utmost good faith,” have been used interchangeably 
to describe the traditionally prevalent “prudent landowner” standard of the “utmost fair 
dealing” duty. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2. 
Differing opinions have been expressed over the years as to what standard of care could 
be imposed on the executive to adequately protect the non-executive interest. Suggestions 
have included the no duty rule; ordinary care and good faith standard; the utmost fair dealing 
standard; and the fiduciary duty. Lloyd Lochridge, Abuse of Executive Rights, 36th Oil & 
Gas Inst. § 2.02 (Matthew Bender 1985). 
For a criticism of the “utmost fair dealing” duty, and its “prudent landowner” standard, 
see Morse and Ross, supra note 95, at 213–28. 
 97. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). 
 98. The standard which requires the “same degree of diligence and discretion on the part 
of the mineral fee holder as would be expected of the average landowner . . .” was taken 
from a leading and oft quoted “utmost fair dealing” case, Federal Land Bank v. United 
States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958). In that case, the court held, inter alia, that the 
unreasonable delay in leasing by the mineral owner which delayed production until after a 
term royalty interest had expired violated the “utmost fair dealing” standard. The standard 
originates from an eminent law review article in the Texas Law Review, Jones, Non-
Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 574. For a short historical discussion of the 
evolution of the “utmost fair dealing” standard, see Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 213–18. 
 99. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 9. See also Lochridge, supra note 96; 2 WILLIAMS 
& MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2, at 210.7. 
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covenant in the deed that severs the non-participating royalty interest from 
the mineral estate.100 
The standard implicitly recognizes that a mineral owner burdened by a 
fraction of non-participating royalty is entitled to pursue his self-interest 
when negotiating the bonus, delay rentals, and other advantageous lease 
terms. The mineral owner is not obliged to subordinate his interest to the 
interest of the non-participating royalty owner. However, the mineral owner 
cannot unduly benefit at the expense of the non-participating royalty owner 
when exercising the executive right. 
The extent to which the mineral owner can act when pursuing his self-
interest at the expense of the non-participating royalty owner is limited by 
the “prudent landowner” standard. If the reasonable prudent landowner, not 
burdened by the outstanding interest, would have negotiated the same deal 
that the mineral owner negotiated, the mineral owner will bear no liability. 
However, if the reasonable prudent landowner would have negotiated a deal 
more favorable to the royalty owner, the mineral owner may be liable.101 
In sum, the “utmost fair dealing” standard examines the fairness of the 
lease royalty share to the non-participating royalty owner in relation to the 
other lease benefits obtained by the mineral owner. This standard is what an 
objective reasonable “prudent landowner” would have bargained for had he 
owned the full mineral fee.102 
The “utmost fair dealing” standard has been criticized for failing to 
provide adequate guidance and predictability in determining whether the 
mineral owner, in rejecting or accepting a lease proposal, will violate the 
standard. For example, assume that a mineral owner who owns no royalty is 
offered two lease proposals. The first is an offer to lease for a $500 per acre 
bonus and a 1/8th royalty. The second lease offer is for a $250 per acre 
bonus and a 3/16th royalty. The nearest production is one mile away and 30 
years ago two dry holes were drilled on the tract. The well logs on the old 
dry holes are missing, if they ever existed. Seismic operations have been 
conducted in the area but the data is confidential to the proprietor and 
unavailable to the mineral owner. What’s an objective “prudent landowner” 
owning the full mineral fee to do? How does a lawyer advise the mineral 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
 101. For the most common explication of the “prudent landowner” criteria of the “utmost 
good faith” standard, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2. 
 102. Dean Ernest Smith notes, “As usually interpreted, utmost fair dealing requires the 
executive right holder to execute the same type of oil and gas lease on the same terms as he 
would have done in the absence of an outstanding non-participating interest in a third party.” 
Smith III, supra note 93, at 371–72. 
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owner who desires to make the right decision, i.e., take the $500 per acre 
bonus, but who also wants to avoid the reasonable likelihood of litigation 
and, more importantly, the possibility of liability? 
A commonly expressed view is that if the lease royalty negotiated by the 
executive is equal to the going royalty rate in the area, no violation of the 
“utmost fair dealing” standard will likely occur.103 Conversely, a lease 
royalty of less than the going rate in the area portends a violation of the 
standard. Under these circumstances, the “utmost fair dealing” standard 
may reflect reality if all influences on lease terms in the area are equal. 
Leases may vary in regard to the primary term offered, the desirability and 
the availability of surface damage and non-development clauses or the 
proximity to drilling operations or production. Any change in the above 
facts may affect the royalty bargained for by an executive rights holder as 
to any particular tract. Thus, the royalty share negotiated by landowners in 
the area is not dispositive, nor necessarily relevant, to the royalty share for 
which the prudent landowner would have bargained. Perhaps, the more 
accurate statement of conventional wisdom is a lease royalty that is less 
than the going lease royalty rate should foreshadow litigation. 
Another criticism of the prudent landowner standard is that it is 
inherently inconsistent. The standard permits the executive rights holder to 
pursue his self interest. However, in pursuing that self interest, he cannot 
benefit himself at the expense of the non-executive. Even though the appar-
ent inconsistency may render the standard difficult to apply, the reason the 
standard emphasizes both the mineral owner’s self interest and protection of 
the non-executive is simple to explain. The mineral owner owns the right to 
the bonus, and like any other rational property owner, he should be free to 
secure the maximum return obtainable from his property. However, the 
mineral owner also negotiates the lease royalty share for the non-
participating royalty owner. Thus, some limitation on the mineral owner’s 
right to pursue his self-interest to the detriment of the nonparticipating 
royalty owner when exercising the executive right is required. The “prudent 
landowner” standard or the “utmost fair dealing” standard attempts to 
balance the irreconcilable interests of the mineral owner and the non-
participating royalty owner. 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Dean Smith argues that the mineral owner should be free without liability under the 
prudent landowner standard to trade off a high bonus for a lower royalty, if the royalty is 
consistent with leasing practices in the area. Ernest E. Smith, The Standard of Conduct 
Owed by Executive Right Holders and Operators to the Owners of Nonparticipating and 
Nonoperating Interests, 32nd Oil & Gas Inst., at 241–44 (Matthew Bender 1981) 
[hereinafter Smith IV]. 
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Finally, the standard is viewed by some as being insufficient to protect 
the interests of the non-executive owner from the rapacity, or lack of 
altruism, of the owner of the executive interest.104 The executive owner 
controls the interests of the non-executive and determines their share in the 
lease benefits. Therefore, some conclude a more stringent standard of care 
than that reflected in the “utmost fair dealing” standard should be imposed 
on the executive, regardless of whatever proprietary interest the latter may 
also have in the mineral estate. 
B. The Fiduciary Duty 
In Manges v. Guerra,105 the Texas Supreme Court held that the owner of 
the executive right to a non-participating mineral interest, who also owned a 
share of the mineral estate, owed a fiduciary duty106 to the non-executive 
interests. 
Manges, the executive, violated the fiduciary duty by leasing107 in excess 
of 25,000 acres to himself for a ten year primary term, at a nominal bonus 
($5 inclusive), $2 per acre annual delay rentals and a 1/8th royalty. Through 
the terms of the lease, Manges acquired the 7/8ths working interest.108 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 229–30. 
 105. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). 
 106. It is disputed as to whether Manges applied a “fiduciary duty” or the traditional 
“utmost fair dealing” standard. The argument for the former is based in part on an initial 
opinion issued in the case but subsequently withdrawn by the Texas Supreme Court, Manges 
v. Guerra, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. 430 (June 8, 1983) (opinion withdrawn). This initial opinion 
contained no language indicating that a fiduciary duty was imposed. However, the 
substituted opinion, Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984), contained such 
language. For an analysis of the case that favors the fiduciary duty construction, see Smith 
III, supra note 93, at 377–78. 
 107. Manges also acquired other benefits for himself which were not shared with his non-
executive mineral cotenants. First, Manges mortgaged by deed of trust the executive right to 
secure a promissory note for approximately $7 million. Next, in connection with another 
loan of $2.8 million (later increased to $5 million), Manges granted an option to purchase 
the production from the mineral estate to a third-party. In addition to securing the loans 
which benefitted Manges but not his nonexecutive mineral cotenants, both transactions 
removed the mineral estate from the leasing market. Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 182. 
The mortgagee declared at trial that the mortgage was not effective as to the mineral 
interests. The trial court declared the mortgage to be ineffective and nonexistent as to the 
executive interest. In addition, the trial court canceled the option to purchase production and 
found Manges liable for failing to lease other lands not subject to the Manges to Manges 
lease, which he could have leased to a third party but did not. Id. at 183. 
 108. When Manges executed the lease to himself, the land was being drained by offset 
production and the non-participating mineral owners had filed suit with lis pendens. Manges 
argued that the suit with lis pendens precluded him from leasing to others. Id. at 182. In 
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Shortly thereafter, Manges farmed-out the lease to a third-party, retaining 
50% of the working interest cost-free. 
The Manges court recognized that the fiduciary duty existing between 
the executive and non-executive is specifically based on the relationship of 
the parties, not on a covenant implied in the deed. The Manges court 
determined that the fiduciary duty required the executive to acquire for the 
non-executive every benefit that the executive acquired for himself. 
Manges, through his self-dealing, gained “special benefits.” The 7/8ths 
working interest from the Manges to Manges lease and the 1/2 cost-free 
working interest from the farm-out were not shared with his non-
executives. Therefore, in addition to actual damages, the court determined 
that the non-participating mineral owners also were entitled to cancellation 
of the Manges to Manges lease and exemplary damages.109 However, the 
court determined that the non-participating mineral owners’ election to sue 
for damages precluded the remedy of cancellation of Manges’ executive 
right.110 
The extent to which the holding in Manges elevates the standard of care 
owed by the executive to the non-executive in the management of the 
mineral estate remains unclear. Typically, a fiduciary duty implies a more 
stringent standard than exists under the “utmost fair dealing” standard. The 
fiduciary standard implicitly suggests that the executive’s right to pursue 
his own self-interest is limited or proscribed. 
However, the fiduciary duty in Manges was imposed under 
circumstances in which a cotenancy between the executive and non-
executive interests existed in the mineral estate. Manges owned an 
undivided 1/2 mineral estate and the executive right to the 1/2 non-
participating mineral estate. The fiduciary duty required the executive to 
acquire for the non-executive every benefit that he exacted for himself. By 
procuring benefits that profit only the executive interest, the executive 
                                                                                                                 
addition to the farm-out, discussed in the text of this article, Manges also granted a “top 
lease” to the third-party that was to be effective if the Manges to Manges lease was judicially 
canceled. Id. at 183. 
 109. The non-participating mineral owners recovered the following from Manges for his 
breach of the fiduciary obligation: their proportionate share as cotenants of the net profits 
from the wells drilled on the canceled Manges-Manges lease; actual damages of 
$382,608.79; and exemplary damages of $500,000. Id. at 183, 184–85. 
 110. The non-participating mineral owner’s basis for canceling the executive right in 
Manges was “fraudulent inducement” to convey the executive right to Manges in the deed of 
severance. The trial court found that the non-participating mineral owners had been 
fraudulently induced to convey their executive interests. Id. at 184. 
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incurs liability. Concomitantly, the pursuit of self-interest by the executive 
at the expense of the non-executive is actionable. 
A fiduciary duty requiring participation on a proportionate ownership 
basis in all of the lease benefits is appropriate when the executive and non-
executive interests share a cotenancy relationship in the mineral estate. 
When a cotenancy exists, there is no necessity to recognize or protect the 
pursuit of self-interest that results in a division of lease benefits unrelated to 
the proportional ownership interests. 
When a mineral owner burdened by a fraction of nonparticipating royalty 
interest exercises the executive right, both parties do not share on a 
proportional ownership basis. The relationship is unlike the cotenancy 
relationship in Manges. The mineral owner is entitled to the bonus, delay 
rental payments, and only a partial share, if any, of the lease royalty. The 
non-participating royalty owner participates only in his share of lease 
royalty. Thus, the mandate of the fiduciary duty in Manges, the acquisition 
of identical benefits for the non-executive when the executive negotiates the 
lease, cannot be applied when the non-executive is a non-participating 
royalty owner. 
That does not mean, however, that the Manges decision has not raised 
the standard of care that the mineral owner owes to the non-participating 
royalty owner. There has been speculation about the exact standard the 
fiduciary duty imposes on the mineral owner who exercises the executive 
right in regard to the non-participating royalty interest. One view is that the 
fiduciary duty prohibits the executive from “acting against the non-
executive’s interest” and requires the executive to “act affirmatively to 
protect the non-executive’s interest.”111 Another view is that the executive’s 
role is analogous to the role of a “trustee” who is also the “life beneficiary” 
of the trust, “who can take his own interest into account in making 
decisions when administering the trust . . . but cannot take unfair 
advantage . . . by making decisions that . . . substantially disadvantage or 
effectively destroy the remainder interest.”112 Under the latter view, the 
executive would be entitled to take his own interest into account and 
consider the right to bonus and delay rentals, so long as his decisions were 
in good faith and did not substantially disadvantage the royalty owner.113 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 232. 
 112. Smith III, supra note 93, at 387–88. 
 113. Smith III, supra note 93, at 387–88. Smith also suggests that the executive under 
this standard should be able to trade a large royalty (1/6th) and a small bonus for a large 
bonus and small royalty (1/8th) so long as the small royalty is consistent with current leasing 
practices in the area. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/6
2017]        Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty 473 
 
 
Hopefully, if the Manges decision elevated the standard of care that the 
mineral owner owes when exercising the executive right in regard to the 
fraction of non-participating royalty interests, the new standard will not 
unduly limit or proscribe the mineral owner’s self-interest when negotiating 
the lease bonus, delay rentals, and other lease benefits like surface damages. 
Requiring the mineral owner to subordinate his interest in a reasonable 
bonus or surface damage protection will diminish his property interest and 
violate the intent of the parties to the deed of severance.114 
Despite the uncertainty that lingers as to the Manges decision’s effect on 
the standard of care, no one doubts that the case has obviously expanded the 
remedies available to the non-executive, including the non-participating 
royalty owner. The remedies are now premised on a breach of the fiduciary 
duty, as opposed to a breach of the implied contract of the “utmost fair 
dealing” standard. Remedies familiar under the law of fiduciaries such as 
exemplary damages, cancellation of either the lease, the executive right, or 
both; and the imposition of a resulting or constructive trust are now 
potentially recoverable by the nonexecutive.115 
However, the Texas Civil Appellate Courts have not construed the 
Manges decision as dictating a wholesale abandoning of the “utmost fair 
dealing” standard with its prudent landowner test. Emphasizing that 
Manges involved cotenants to a mineral interest where the executive owner 
had determined by lease the share of royalty, bonus, and delay rentals 
received by the non-participating mineral owners, the appellate courts have 
limited the fiduciary duty imposed by Manges to instances in which the 
executive “controls” the amount of lease benefits received by a non-
executive owner.116 Thus, the fiduciary duty of Manges is imposed on a 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Mack Keith McCollum, Manges v. Guerra: The Executive Right Holder Undergoes 
Close Scrutiny, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 189, 203 (1986). 
 115. For a complete description of the potential remedies, see Morse & Ross, supra note 
95, at 231. 
 116. The distinction that “control” over the lease benefits is determinative as to whether 
the fiduciary standard of Manges is applicable appears well-entrenched in the Texas Civil 
Appellate Courts. For example, in Dearing, Inc. v. Spiller, 824 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992), the fiduciary standard was applied to a non-participating mineral interest. Mims v. 
Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), involved the applicability of the fiduciary 
standard to a fraction of non-participating royalty interest. Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 
263-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rejected the applicability of the fiduciary duty to a fractional 
share royalty interest and applied the “utmost good faith” prudent landowner standard. 
Finally, Comanche Land & Cattle Co. v. Adams, 688 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), 
applied the fiduciary duty standard to a fraction of defeasible term non-participating royalty 
interest. 
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mineral owner with the executive right to a fraction of non-participating 
royalty.117 The imposition of this duty mandates, at least,118 that the owner 
of the latter interest receive their proportionate share of whatever royalty 
the executive obtains in the lease negotiation. Conversely, the fractional 
share royalty interest which is entitled to its fixed fractional share 
regardless of the size of the lease royalty, is protected by the “utmost fair 
dealing” standard of the prudent landowner test.119  
Mims v. Beal120 is an illustrative case. In that case, the plaintiffs owned a 
1/4th of non-participating royalties with John Mims and his wife, Chattie, 
owning the executive right. The Mimses executed an oil and gas lease to 
their son, Angus Mims, that provided for no bonus and a 1/8th royalty. Five 
months later, Angus Mims assigned the lease to a third-party in return for a 
1/16th overriding royalty. Plaintiffs, contending that the 1/8th royalty in the 
Angus Mims lease was unreasonably low, sued John and Chattie Mims and 
Angus Mims for damages occasioned by breach of the duty owed by the 
executive to the non-executive in the Mims to Mims lease. Finding that the 
“duty of good faith and fair dealing” was breached, the trial court awarded 
actual damages against the Mimses. Also, for “participating in the breach,” 
the court assessed actual damages against Angus Mims. A constructive trust 
was imposed on the nonparticipating royalty owner’s share of the 
overriding interest in the third-party lease. Further, finding that both parties 
acted in an “unconscionable, willful, and wanton manner and in total 
disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights,” exemplary damages of $2500 were 
assessed against the Mimses and $5000 against Angus Mims. 
On appeal, both defendants argued that no fiduciary relationship existed 
between the Mimses and the plaintiffs. The court rejected the defendants’ 
argument and held that the fiduciary standard of Manges applied because 
the exercise of the executive right “controlled” the amount of royalty that 
the fraction of non-participating royalty interest receives under the lease. 
The executive violated the fiduciary obligation in several respects by 
executing the Mims to Mims lease. For example, the executive engaged in 
“self dealing” which included parents dealing with a son and a failure to 
negotiate at arms length for current market terms. Moreover, as a 
consequence of the self-dealing, the son’s overriding royalty interest 
reserved in the third-party lease was treated as if it were owned by the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See Mims, 810 S.W.2d at 876; Comanche Land and Cattle Co., 688 S.W.2d at 914. 
 118. The question remains unanswered as to whether the fiduciary standard of Manges 
requires the executive to exact for the non-executive the highest royalty obtainable. 
 119. Pickens, 764 S.W.2d at 263. 
 120. 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
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parents. This resulted in the executives having exacted a royalty share for 
themselves which was not shared with the non-participating royalty owner. 
Therefore, on appeal, the court affirmed the award of actual and exemplary 
damages against the executives, the Mimses, as well as the imposition of 
the constructive trust on the overriding interest. 
VI. The Lessee’s Liability For Inducing Or Participating In The Breach Of 
The Standard Of Care 
Mims v. Beall illustrates the potential for a lessee to incur liability in the 
leasing transaction in which the mineral owner with the executive right 
violates the requisite standard of care owed to the non-executive interest. 
Angus Mims, the son, was the lessee to the lease in which the executives, 
his parents, violated the fiduciary duty to the nonparticipating royalty 
owners. As the lessee, Angus Mims did not owe a fiduciary duty to the non-
participating royalty owners. However, the court determined that as the 
lessee, Angus Mims was liable to the non-executive interest for “knowingly 
participating” in the breach of the executive duty. Thus, the court affirmed 
the award of actual and exemplary damages against the lessee. Further, the 
court determined that an executive who breaches the standard of care owed 
to the non-executive and the lessee who induces or participates in that 
breach are jointly and severally liable. 
The general rule of liability for the lessee who takes a lease from an 
executive subject to a non-executive interest was stated in Mims v. Beall: 
So long as the lessee maintains an arm’s length position in the 
transaction, he does not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of utmost 
good faith to the owner of the non-executive interest. If, 
however, the lessee agrees with the executive to an arrangement 
made for the purpose of excluding or minimizing the benefits of 
an outstanding or non-participating interest owner, the lessee can 
be held liable to the injured third party.121 
Thus, if the lessee either “induces” the executive to breach the standard 
of care or “knowingly participates” in the breach, for example, by agreeing 
to an arrangement with the executive for the express purpose of lessening 
the non-executive’s lease benefits, the lessee is liable to the non-executive 
interest. “Induce” clearly encompasses “planting the seed in the mind” of 
the executive that the two should cut a deal that breaches the duty. 
However, the mere offer of a lower than prevailing royalty and a higher 
than customary bonus by the lessee as a special incentive for the executive 
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to grant the lease may well constitute “inducement” and cause the lessee to 
incur liability. Furthermore, the lessee also cannot “knowingly participate” 
in the executive’s perpetration of the breach of duty owed to the non-
executive. The lessee cannot agree with the executive to a royalty share that 
has the express purpose of excluding or lessening the non-participating 
royalty owner’s royalty share. 
More importantly, the court indicated that the lessee may also be liable if 
he should reasonably have been aware that the executive was acting in 
breach of his duty. As to this basis of liability, the court further noted that 
the fact that the non-participating royalty deed is recorded puts the lessee on 
constructive notice of the existence of the nonparticipating royalty owner. 
An important lesson of Mims v. Beall is that the lessee can avoid liability 
while negotiating a lease from a mineral owner burdened by a non-
participating royalty interest. A fundamental premise of the decision is that 
the lessee does not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of utmost fair dealing to 
the non-participating royalty owner. So long as the lessee maintains the 
negotiations with the executive owner at arms length and secures a lease 
from the executive that is competitive with current market conditions, 
including the royalty prevailing in the area, the lessee should be able to 
avoid liability. 
However, what is unsettling about Mims v. Beall is the court’s dicta that 
indicates the lessee may be liable if he should have reasonably been aware 
that the executive was acting in breach of the executive’s duty to the non-
participating royalty owner. Thus, if a lease is taken on the basis of a 
superficial title search which does not determine the existence and extent of 
non-participating royalty interests but only focuses on the ownership of the 
executive right, the lessee may be found liable to the non-participating roy-
alty owner for agreeing to lease terms that involve unusually low royalty or 
an overriding royalty interest that is structured as bonus. 
VII. Conclusion 
Non-participating royalty interests should incite caution in both the 
lawyer and the landman. There is an important difference between a 
fraction of and a fractional share royalty interest. Care must be taken when 
construing royalty deeds to determine if a fraction of or a fractional share 
royalty has been conveyed. Older royalty conveyances have created a 
wealth of interpretation problems and an array of inconsistent, often 
puzzling case law. Finally, courts are construing more stringently the 
substantive content of the duty that a mineral owner owes to the fraction of 
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non-participating royalty owner when negotiating the oil and gas lease and 
are awarding more drastic remedies for breach of this duty. Even though the 
lessee owes no duty to the non-participating royalty owner in the lease 
negotiations, to avoid the imposition of liability including the possibility of 
punitive damages and lease cancellation, the lessee must exercise care to 
avoid “inducing” or “knowingly participating” in the executive’s breach, or 
being caught in a situation where the lessee “should have known that he 
was participating” in the executive’s breach. 
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